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INTRODUCTION
A. Prelude-Chevron Case and the Challenge of Governing
Transnational Corporations Through "Soft Law"

After eighteen years of litigation, on February 14, 2011 an
Ecuadorian judge ordered the oil conglomerate Chevron to pay eighteen
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billion dollars in damages, "the largest judgment ever awarded in an
environmental lawsuit," 1 in the oil contamination case Afectados ("the
Affected") v. Chevron. 2 The judgment was affirmed on appeal a year
later, 3 yet the case is far from over. The liable parties remain to be
called to account and the environmental damage is still to be remedied.
Chevron no longer has considerable assets in Ecuador; 4 it has lodged an
appeal with the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, and a United Nations
Commission on International Trade ("UNCITRAL") arbitration before
the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA") in The Hague has
witnessed a number of interim awards in favor of Chevron. 5 In the
media, the case has been described as a local plaintiffs' apparently
fruitless legal struggle in a society with a corrupt judiciary and political
and economic dependence on foreign oil companies. 6
The Chevron case evidences the difficulties in properly governing
transnational corporations ("TNCs"), sometimes even to prevent the
most egregious of abuses. Multiple international and domestic laws
may be applicable, but that often seems detrimental rather than helpful.
Weaknesses in the content, implementation and enforcement of laws
may allow the politically and economically powerful parties to
dominate the situation. Thus, in cases such as Chevron, alternative
means of governance are desperately needed to address the failures of
1. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012),
available at http://feeds.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01 /09/reversal-of-fortune-patrickradden-keefe (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Reversal of Fortune].
2. See generally Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2011) Trial No. 2003-0002,
Provincial
Court
of
Justice
of
Sucumbios
(Ecuador),
available
at
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-02-14-Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco-judgementEnglish. pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
3. See generally Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2012) Case No. 2011-0106,
Provincial
Court
of
Justice
of
Sucumbios
(Ecuador),
available
at
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-01-03-appeal-decision-english.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1,2015).
4. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Chevron Will Settle in Ecuador, NEW YORKER (Jan.
4, 2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/01 /whychevron-will-settle-in-ecuador.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
5. See generally Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador
(U.S. v. Ecuador), Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013) ("Fourth Interim Award on
Interim Measures"); Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador
(U.S. v. Ecuador), Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) ("Third Interim Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility"). The case is still pending at the moment of publication.
Chevron's main argument is that its due process rights were denied before the Ecuadorian
courts because of undue influence on the judiciary by the Ecuadorian government. The
arbitral tribunal still has to decide on the merits whether the issuing of the Ecuadorian
judgment was in violation of the investment agreement.
6. See Reversal a/Fortune, supra note 1.
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classic international and domestic laws in protecting the environment
and human rights. "Soft law" is then often hailed as the remedy.
Chevron, for example, is indeed an active participant in several
voluntary initiatives and schemes, such as the Social Responsibility
Group of the International Petroleum Industry Environmental
Conservation Association ("IPIECA"). 7 Chevron was also one of the
companies consulted during the drafting of UN Special Representative
John Ruggie's UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 8
Proposing "soft law" as the solution in more effectively governing
transnational giants such as Chevron leads, however, to a fundamental
conundrum: it remains quite unclear what the notion of "soft law"
entails, and why and how it could be able to provide an adequate policy
response. The objective of this paper therefore is to clarify the
discussion through a detailed theoretical analysis of "soft law," and to
test the findings in the practically pivotal area of the environmental and
human rights conduct of TN Cs.

B. The Thesis and the Objectives
This paper claims, using the fields of environmental protection and
human rights as examples, that "soft law" is conceptually and
substantively inadequate and misleading in filling the voids left by
classic "hard law" in governing TNCs. A reconceptualization of, and a
more systematic approach to, soft instruments is required if they are to
play a constructive part in filling the void.
The paper proceeds in five steps to prove its thesis and to propose
remedies to the identified shortcomings. The first objective is to show
that what has been called classic "hard law" - state laws and the formal
sources of international law - seems to fail in adequately governing
TNCs. Second, the paper explains why other, "soft law" instruments
are believed to address the void, but reveals as the third step that the
current way of understanding such other, "soft law" instruments is
inadequate and too general for assessing the successes or failures of
such a very diverse group of instruments. The paper therefore seeks as
its fourth objective to create and assess better methods for approaching
the void, and proposes to that account a tool that Fe-conceptualizes and
systemizes the soft law discourse. Fifth, preliminary tests of such a new

7. See INT'L PETROLEUM INDUS. ENVTL. CONSERVATION Ass'N (IPIECA), available at
http://www.ipieca.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
8. Obviously, the "soft law" instruments cited here date from after the relevant facts of
the Chevron case.
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tool are conducted by applying it to practical case studies of TNC
behavior in the fields of environmental and human rights protection.
The paper concludes by showing how the notion of "soft law" is not
only obscure and inadequate, as has been previously contended by other
scholars, but that it also is conceptually deceptive in ways that risk
leading towards ineffective policy instruments. "Softness" on the other
hand does seem instructive for better understanding and reacting to the
challenges of managing transnational corporations.

I. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ("TNCS")

A. Business Across the Borders
The first objective of this paper is to show how classic "hard law"
seems to fail in adequately governing transnational corporations
(TNCs). The U.N.'s Special Representative on business and human
rights has stated that TNCs come in many varieties on a scale from little
to almost complete reliance on transnational activities. 9
The
qualification of a company as a TNC is thus not based on its legal
personality; corporations of various legal forms can be included in the
category of TN Cs. More important than an undisputable definition of a
TNC is, however, that there are important factual and regulatory
problems that arise as a consequence of corporations pursuing activities
in multiple jurisdictions. Globalization of the marketplace has driven
companies to operate across borders. Many companies have become
TNCs, and many TNCs have become global actors. This is no longer
limited to developed country based businesses; numerous TN Cs are
Asian or South American companies. With the emergence of multiple
trade areas ( such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN") or the Andean Community in Latin-America) the TNC has
truly "gone global."

B. The Sanctuary of Multiple Jurisdictions
The activities of TNCs are spread among the territories of many
so-called host states. In the majority of cases, and often due to

9. See Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. Human
Rights Council, 8th Sess., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and
Human Rights, para. 6-7, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John G. Ruggie)
[hereinafter Ruggie].
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requirements in domestic laws, they are nonetheless based in a single
home state. In contrast to domestically operating businesses, however,
they do not fall under the complete control of a single jurisdiction, not
even that of their home state. They are partially subject to the domestic
legal systems of their home state and of all the host states in which parts
of their fragmented, networked activities take place or have effects.
Domestic laws are to an increasing extent harmonized by
international law, such as customary law and conventions. On many
issues, however, domestic legal systems still vary considerably, in
particular in the implementation and enforcement of law. This variance
may create a void: activities in a particular jurisdiction risk escaping the
(legal) consequences that would and should have followed.
A
hazardous part of waste treatment activities may be located in a country
where such activities are not subject to (stringent) standards, for
example, or labor-intensive work in the textile sector is set up in a
country where labor laws permit longer working hours, or the part of
operations that is subject to high taxes in the company's de facto home
state is formally relocated to a tax haven.
Innovative judges may find ways around the issue of multiple
jurisdictions with different substantive standards. In some of the recent
judgments from the lower court and the court of appeals in the Chevron
case, for example, the judges were not held back by the fact that neither
environmental standards nor legal protection of the areas belonging to
indigenous people existed in Ecuador at the time of the tort. Yet the
judges reasoned that it was enough that "the existence of damages has
been verified," combined with "the right to obtain compensation for
damages suffered in its various forms, which was recognized by the
Civil Code well before the start of Texpet [Texaco, predecessor of
Chevron] activities in the Amazon." 10 Thus, a specific prohibition of an
environmental harm was not deemed necessary to establish a tort. In
various Wes tern jurisdictions, arguments are being forwarded that the
home state standards should apply to "their" TNCs' activities in the host
states as well. 11
10. Aguinda, Case No. 2011-0106, para. 9 (further arguing by the Appeals Court found
"the fact that there is no express mention of environmental damages in references to
contingent damages in the Civil Code does not mean that environmental damages cannot be
contingent damages, nor does it mean that the legislature wished to exclude the possibility
that environmental damages could be considered to be contingent damages.").
11.
See generally Jonathan Verschuuren, Overcoming the Limitations of
Environmental Law in a Globalised World, in A HANDBOOK OF GLOBALISATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, SECOND EDITION: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN A
GLOBAL ARENA 616 (Frank Wijen et al. eds., 2012).
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C. Resistance Towards the Implementation and Reform of
Domestic Law and International Law
The opportunities of globalization have made many transnationally
operating companies extremely wealthy, superseding in economic terms
many nation states. The largest TNCs have become especially
influential economic and political players, both in the various domestic
jurisdictions where they operate, as well as on the global level. For
example, many developing countries rely on TNCs to use their
resources. The TNCs may thereby have a clear advantage over local
actors in influencing the creation or implementation of law by domestic
authorities, although this will vary case by case.
Unlike local
companies, TNCs can often rather easily shift their activities from one
country to another, should a local government advocate for instance to
more stringently enforce costly environmental standards. TNCs are also
often backed by Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs"), concluded
between their home state and their host state. The BITs may allow the
TN Cs to threaten to sue the host state for expropriation, should the
enforcement of laws risk harming the company economically. Such a
BIT is also the basis for Chevron's claim before the PCA in the
Chevron case. 12
TNCs-especially when acting together through sectorial global
business associations or high-profile events such as the World
Economic Forum in Davos 13 - are also a powerful force influencing
the decisions made in international organizations and diplomatic
negotiations. The scope of the TN Cs' organizations gives them a global
overview and a strategic grip of the policy discourse that particularly the
developing states may struggle to match. This power may allow the
TN Cs to create or sustain a void on the global level, which moves or
keeps parts of the corporations' operations beyond the reach of the
domestic and international legal orders.

12. See generally Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993,
103-15 (1997).
13. The publicly visible tip of the proverbial iceberg of this political influence
occurred at the yearly World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. See Ellen Paine, The
Road to the Global Compact: Corporate Power and the Battle Over Global Public Policy at
the United Nations, GLOBAL POL'Y FORUM (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_The_road_to_the_global_compact_October_
2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). Incidentally, the 1999 Forum was also one of the
earliest occasions where the UN Global Compact was formally and informally discussed.
See id.

s. TREATY Doc. No.
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D. Domestic Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs -Host
State and Home State Dimensions
The ability of the TNCs to escape full regulatory control and to
exert political pressure on decision makers clearly creates the risk of a
legal void. 14 This paper defines a legal void as a regulatory situation in
which a TNC behavior, permitted in a host state, would have been in
violation of the laws of the TNC home state or of international law. The
legal void may be viewed as part of a (wider) policy void, whereby the
public policy objective on the particular question is not reached.
The legal void reveals itself in a slightly different fashion in the
home states (where the company is incorporated) than in the host states
(where the TNCs operate). As De Feyter submits, "developing and
transition countries [i.e. often the 'host states'] compete to attract
foreign investment and technology to exploit natural resources, and are
often reluctant to impose human rights and other conditions on foreign
companies." 15 In the case of developing country host states, there thus
may be a system of laws that is applicable-the problem is that it either
sets very low standards (in which case the legal void is qualitative) or it
does not properly apply the higher standards (in which case the legal
void is one of enforcement).
On the other hand, De Feyter continues, "[t ]he home state is faced
with the difficulty that, in principle, the reach of domestic law is limited
to its own territory." 16 To overcome the limits of home country
jurisdiction, some states exceptionally recognize universal or extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over torts outside their territory. 17 However,
the potential of such extra-territorial jurisdiction is for various reasons
quite limited. 18 Suffice it to say here that international law allows extraterritorial (or universal) jurisdiction only for a few crimes under
international customary law. These offenses may be enforced by any
state(s) regardless of their ties with the offense. 19

14. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights speak of "governance
gaps created by globalization." See Ruggie, supra note 9, at 3.
15. Koen De Feyter, Globalisation and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 51, 81-82 (Felipe Gomez Isa & Koen De Feyter eds., 2009).
16. Id. at 82 ( emphasis added).
17. See generally Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
18. See generally Donald F. Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition
of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142-63 (2006).
19. Universal civil jurisdiction of U.S. courts remains nonetheless a tool of at least
some usefulness for the most gruesome abuses that remain unprosecuted in the states where
they occur.
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Another possibility to overcome the home state problem is the
active nationality principle, which allows a state to exercise prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction over its nationals for offenses they commit
abroad. In practice, however, states are not likely to use this option
more than sparsely, and have done so in the past only for a limited
number of crimes. An important reason for this is that it conflicts with
competing jurisdictional claims of other states, primarily the
territoriality principle. Another reason is that international law does not
allow states to enforce such jurisdiction abroad, for example to collect
evidence or to make arrests.

E. International Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs
If there is a void in domestic law regulating TNC activities, one
might assume that international law could better succeed in addressing
this distinct group of actors. Surely international law, which can
potentially contain universal or near-universal rules, 20 could help in
filling the void left by domestic law. In addition, it could be argued that
the international legal order is positioned 'close' to the transnational
sphere, where TNCs themselves operate.
There are four ways in which international human rights law may
apply or be applied to TNCs 21 : (1) it can be applied directly, (2) almost
directly, (3) transposed into national law or (4) applied indirectly. In
international environmental law, the picture is somewhat different,
because directly and almost directly applicable international law is
practically non-existent. The application of most international law to
individuals depends on transposition or indirect application.
Particularly those two means of application do not overcome a number
of obstacles to effectively regulating TNCs through international law.
As noted earlier, the matter is elaborated here through the examples of
international environmental and human rights law.

1. Lack ofInternational Law (almost) Directly and Specifically
Applicable to TNCs
In contrast to states and intergovernmental organizations, TN Cs are
generally not considered subjects of international law, and are as such

20. See generally Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
529 (1993).
21. This section uses the taxonomy suggested by John H. Knox. See generally John H.
Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
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not directly bound by most of it. 22 TNCs entertain only certain rights
and have a limited set of obligations23 on the basis on international law
directly. These rights and obligations are similar to those directly
applicable to all private actors. 24 Direct applicability of international
law entails that both national judicial organs of home, host and
potentially other states, as well as international tribunals, enforce the
international law obligations directly, even without such provisions
being transposed into national law. 25 The direct applicability of
international law to the conduct26 of TN Cs as private actors is limited to
a few international human rights related crimes, such as genocide and
crimes against humanity, based on customary international law. 27 As
mentioned above, universal jurisdiction to enforce such obligations is
the least controversial.
There is another set of obligations that, in Knox's terminology, is
applied "almost directly" to private actors. These obligations are not
directly applicable, but they specifically instruct states-including
dualist states-how to place requirements on private actors and how to
enforce them through domestic laws. The transposition of such
provisions is thus strictly predetermined. 28 The Convention Against
Torture 29 and the Convention on Child Labor30 contain examples of
22. P.A. NOLLKAEMPER, KERN VAN HET INTERNATIONAAL PUBLIEKRECHT 58-59 (5th
ed. 2011 ). For human rights specifically see, e.g., Robert McCorquodale, Corporate Social
Responsibility and International Human Rights Law, 87 J. Bus. ETHICS 385 (2009).
23. If a legal provision requires an action or inaction from an actor, it is a legal
obligation.
24. See Knox, supra note 21, at 2 (speaking generally of private duties).
25. However, the question of extraterritoriality arises in the context of applying it in
home states, however, see infra Section I (E)(2).
26. The present paper does not focus on the rights of TN Cs.
27. In the words of the human rights scholar John Knox, "[ v]irtually all of these duties
are found in international criminal law. The paradigmatic example is the Genocide
Convention, which states that 'genocide ... is a crime under international law' that the
parties 'undertake to prevent and to punish,' through both domestic tribunals and 'such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction."' Knox, supra note 21, at 28. These
provisions are not only directly targeted at, but also internationally enforced upon individual
parties, including TNCs. See id. Direct applicability to companies is sometimes seen to be
contrary to the basic consensual premise of international law. See id. How can TN Cs have
obligations on the basis of international law to which they have not consented?
28. Id. at 28-29. The obligations concern duties, such as the prohibitions on slavery
(Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, April 30, 1956) and torture (Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984).
The parties to these conventions are states that are obliged to make slavery and torture
criminal offences under their domestic laws and to enforce them upon private parties. Id.
29. See Knox, supra note 21, at 28-29.
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such "almost directly applicable international law." However, the
limited number of these kinds of provisions leaves many parts of the
legal void uncovered. Another reason for the void is that the provisions
do not tend to address the behavior of TN Cs specifically. 31
As far as the international obligations that are placed "almost
directly" upon the individuals are specific, they de facto create quasiuniversal domestic criminal law. In other words, the global application
is decentralized, so that the direct applicability, and almost direct
applicability, approaches can make good use of domestic courts'
enforcement capacities, which are far superior to those of international
judicial institutions. Political will permitting, this seems the most
promising international law track to pursue in governing TNCs. It
could in theory combine a universal and precise prescription of
obligations specifically for transnational commercial activities with the
high enforcement capacities of domestic authorities. A contracting state
would not fulfill its own international obligations, should it not enforce
the provisions against TN Cs under its jurisdiction.

2. Poor Domestic Implementation and Enforcement of International
Law - Back to Square One?
The third and fourth types of international law that deal with the
internal policies of developed western states, including international
human rights law and international environmental law, are not directly
applicable to TNCs. 32 International treaty provisions need to be
properly transposed into the domestic legal system in order to create the
intended legal effect on the TNCs. The states often retain a large
measure of freedom in this respect. For example, many environmental
treaty provisions, such as the provisions in the Montreal Protocol on the
downscaling of the production of ozone depleting substances, must be
first transposed into domestic law and then properly implemented if a
state is to meet its obligations under the treaty. The treaty will in this
way become binding, not only on the state in question, but also in the
form of national law on those operating a production facility of ozone

30. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, June 17, 1999, 87 ILO 182.
31. See INT' L CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1992,
reprinted in INT'L OIL COMPENSATION FUNDS, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL
POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CONVENTION, TH E 1992 FUND CONVENTION AND
THE
SUPPLEMENTARY
FUND
PROTOCOL
(2011),
available
at
http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx _ iopcpublications/Text_of_Conventions_e. pdf
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter CLC] (for an example of the latter)
32. On indirect applicability, see infra note 33.
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depleting substances within the jurisdictions.
The obligation to incorporate and enforce the international norm
rests on the states and it is left to the state in question to decide exactly
how it will incorporate and enforce the international law provisions.
This is problematic if the content of the international norm is too vague
to establish clearly whether a state has failed to discharge its duties or
not. This is often the case in international human rights law and
international environmental law.
Finally, international law may also be indirectly applicable on
TN Cs. Indirect applicability means that the (existing) laws of the
domestic legal system are construed, i.e. interpreted in a manner that is
as much in conformity with international law as possible. 33 Most of the
international human rights law and international environmental law can
be considered indirectly applicable. 34
For example, state parties must take the above noted provisions of
the Montreal Protocol on the downscaling of the production of ozone
depleting substances duly into consideration in interpreting their
relevant domestic norms, to be consistent with their obligations under
the treaty. The interpretation will also affect the TNCs operating within
the jurisdiction.
There is certain hierarchy in the way that domestic courts rely on
direct and indirect applicability of international law. In striving to
achieve conformity with the international norm, the courts give priority
to consistent interpretation, i.e. indirect applicability. Only if the
domestic law is so inconsistent with international law that it is not
reconcilable by favorably interpreting domestic law, will the courts rely
on international law directly. 35 Indirect applicability of international
law is thus the primary means of trying to fill in the gaps of domestic
law on TNCs.
However, the value added of all the not-directly-applicable
33. See Andre Nollkaemper & Gerrit Betlem, Giving Effect to Public International
Law and European Community Law Before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of
the Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 569, 582 (2003).
34. The two general international human rights conventions-the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICESCR)-are
prominent examples of international law obligations that apply indirectly to TNCs. The
same goes for international obligations on states in the realm of environmental protection:
they ultimately have some impact upon the legality of natural and legal persons' behavior.
This is true for both monist and dualist states.
35. R.H. LAUWAARS & C.W.A. TIMMERMANS, EUROPEES GEMEENSCHAPSRECHT IN KORT
BESTEK 100 (4th ed. 1997); see Nollkaemper & Betlem, supra note 33, at 569.
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provisions of international law in diminishing the void left by domestic
law is often quite limited. The very same "host state problem" that was
explained for law of purely domestic origin resurfaces, unsurprisingly,
in the transposition, implementation, and interpretation of international
obligations in domestic law.36 The broad and generic language of
international agreements often leaves states ample room for discretion
in incorporating international law into domestic legislation, and even
more in enforcing it. The TNCs are able to exert their clout as with any
other domestic law.
The indirect application of interpreting
international law by courts would be in a better position, should the
courts be more resilient to (external political) pressure than the
legislature. This is not necessarily the case in practice, however. Yet
even where free from external pressures, the fragmented, transboundary
nature of TNC activities may in the end preclude any nation state- or
multiple states-from effectively enforcing an international
obligation. 37
The international law obligations are thus rarely globally directly
and specifically applicable to TNCs. The policy void of TNCs cannot
be fully and effectively addressed through present international law.
3. Nigerian Farmers v. Shell - The Absence of International Law in
"Home State" Cases

The Nigerian Farmers v. Shell case is a good example of how
international law is still absent in "home state" court cases that involve
"home state" TNCs. In that case, four inhabitants of Oruma (Nigeria)
sued Shell and its subsidiary companies before a civil court in the
Netherlands, i.e. the "home state" of Shell. 38 The case concerned an oil
leakage from a Shell pipeline that had, according to the plaintiffs,
caused damage to the local environment and to the incomes of
fishermen and farmers. The domestic court in The Hague 39 decided that
according to the Dutch conflict of laws rules on tort cases, it had to
apply Nigerian law in this dispute. Indeed, the case is a classic
attestation of the home state problem, where only the below-par
developing country standards are applied to TN Cs.
Having decided that Nigerian law was applicable, the Dutch court
36. Questions relating to the monistic versus dualistic systems in transposing
international law are left aside here.
37. De Feyter, supra note 15, at 81-82.
38. Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC & Shell Petroleum Development
Company, Merits Decision of 30 January 2013 (LJN: BU3535) [Language: Dutch].
39. To be clear, this is not one of the Hague international courts and tribunals.
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made another important procedural decision: it denied the plaintiffs
access to documents solely in possession of Shell cum suis, even though
the documents could have given further insight into the causes and
consequences of the oil leakage. The court concluded that Shell and its
Nigerian daughter company had, on the face of the evidence already
available to the court, not acted in violation of any obligations under
Nigerian law.
In making its decision, the court did not check whether Nigerian
law was in accordance with international environmental, human rights,
or labor law. For example, the court concluded that under Nigerian law,
an oil company does not seem to be under an obligation to replace
deteriorated pipelines. Yet, the court did not examine whether there
were international rules that would have forced Nigeria to enact such an
obligation, or that would have mandated it to interpret Nigerian law in
accordance with international law. The obligation would have existed
in the legal system of The Netherlands and other developed countries.
The court also disregarded all potential violations of international law in
concluding that under Nigerian law, only the owner of a polluted fishing
pond or property was able to claim losses, and that future losses could
not be claimed.
The stance taken by the Dutch court seems understandable from
the viewpoint of sovereignty. It would be quite far-reaching if a court
were to rule on the compatibility of another country's law with
international standards. It is also doubtful whether any international
standards were sufficiently precise so as to enable a meaningful
conformity check. Still, it seems somewhat illogical that as soon as a
foreign law becomes applicable, international law will no longer be of
relevance. And what would be the difference between applying foreign
law and applying international norms to which the foreign state has
consented? Whatever the merits of the above considerations, it seems
unlikely both in practice and in legal theory that international law will
fill the legal void in cases like this.
F. "Hard Law" as an Insufficient Means to Address TNCs

To summarize, the current framework of domestic law and
international law appears incapable of fully managing the effects of
globalization, in particular the global nature of commercial activities.
The variation in domestic laws, together with the TNCs' economic and
political power and ability to partially avoid falling under the laws of a
specific state, allows the corporations to operate to some degree in a
legal void. As defined above, a legal void is a regulatory situation in
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which a TNC behavior in a host state would have been in violation of
the laws of the TN C home state or of international law. There is very
limited, directly applicable international law, and the transposition,
implementation, and enforcement of international law usually leave the
several state institutions/branches with (considerable) room for
maneuver. International law is therefore unable to improve the
situation.
As a result of the problems that both national and international law
have in controlling TNCs, there is room for misconduct. In the words
of the U.N. Special Representative:
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization-between the scope
and impact of economic forces, and the capacity of societies to manage
their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds
without adequate sanctioning or reparation. 40
The Chevron case, introduced at the outset of this paper, is a case
in point on these challenges. The Ecuadorian government had been in a
joint venture with the oil company at the time of the pollution. It thus
appears to have been at least silently complicit in the abuses. The
whole of the Ecuadorian economy had been dependent on the
exploitation of oil resources, so there was a counter-incentive to
faithfully implement national legislation or international rules. The
Ecuadorian judicial system offered no remedy, either, as it proved to be
extremely weak and corrupt. Several judges had to step down during
the long process amidst accusations of corruption, while others were
seen to have a clear allegiance with either side of the conflict. 41
In terms of environmental law, Chevron did acknowledge the
environmental pollution to some degree, but argued that its predecessor
Texaco had acted "completely in line with the standards of the day" and
that "[the] practices did not directly violate Ecuadoran law; in fact, the
country had no meaningful environmental regulations at the time." 42 In
other words, behavior that presumably would have been illegal in the
United States at the time 43 was in all earnestness claimed to be perfectly
legitimate in Ecuador. However, the courts in the United States, where
40. Ruggie, supra note 9, para. 6-7.
41. Reversal of Fortune, supra note I.
42. Id.
43. "In the United States, it is standard practice, once the oil has been isolated from
this mixture, to 'reinject' the produced water, pumping it deep underground into dedicated
wells, in order to prevent damage to the local habitat." Id.
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the case had originally been brought in 1993, found in 2001 that the
case had "everything to do with Ecuador and very little to do with the
United States."44 It thereby refused an extra-territorial application of
U.S. law, affirming that a U.S. company did not have to live up to U.S.
standards as long as it acted abroad and the judicial system there did not
take issue with the activities.
It is telling that probably the clearest invocation of international
law in the Chevron case was on the part of the TN C-defendant Chevron.
The legal representatives of the company moved the forum to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration on the basis of the Bilateral Investment
Treaty between the U.S. and Ecuador. All in all, the Chevron case is a
tangible illustration of the failures of domestic, extraterritorial and
international law in governing TNCs in a global environment.
It has so far proven impossible to come to a formal international
agreement, or a treaty specifically addressing TNCs or transnational
commercial activities to alleviate the void. Perhaps such a treaty even
could not alleviate the matter, as it too may be bound to suffer from
many of the structural problems previously explained. It appears very
unlikely that the causes behind the void will disappear any time soon.
The governance of TN Cs (or transnational commercial activities more
generally) clearly appears to require responses beyond classic "hard
law."

II. FILLING WITH "SOFT LAW" THE VOID LEFT BY "HARD
LAW"?
The last two decades have witnessed a continuous proliferation of
instruments-public, private and any combination thereof-that
specifically address TNCs, but seem to do so by expanding beyond the
notion of classic "hard law." Strictly speaking, instruments that fall
outside the category of "law" cannot perhaps alleviate a legal void. But
they may, in more general terms, address the practical problem at stake,
which is abusive company behavior. Instruments other than legal ones
can, in other words, alleviate the policy void in question.
The term "soft law" has often been used to denote these types of
instruments. The multiplicity, volume and variance of such soft
instruments, as well as their coexistence with the "hard law" framework
has created a regulatory situation that is much more difficult to

44. Id.
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understand than the 'straight-forward' formal agreements. 45 Scholarly
and practical attention seems necessary to better understand the
possibilities and shortcomings of using "soft law" instruments in filling
the void left by "hard law".
The reasons that are often presented for using "soft law"46 may be
divided into three generic groups.
Necessity-there exists only limited binding and effective hard
legal instruments now and in the foreseeable future;
Uniqueness-the coverage of "soft law" instruments is extensive,
and may influence TNCs in ways that "hard law" does not. They can be
much more specific to TNC behavior, and their adoption and adaptation
may be more flexible and quicker; and
Inevitability-the emerging transnational space renders it
inevitable that a separate transnational normative order emerges as well.
It inevitably consists of other types of instruments, as the non-state
actors who operate in this space cannot make "hard law."
A more careful look into these three, partly overlapping groups
appears instructive for properly understanding the reasons that have
been proposed to explain the emergence "soft law" (Sections II (A) and
II (B)). It is important to shortly describe also the views of those more
pessimistic about the use of "soft law" as an alternative or a
complement to classic "hard law". Some authors see "soft law" rather as
working antagonistically against "hard law" (see Section II (C)).

A. Turning a Political Necessity into a Virtue - "Soft Law" as an
Alternative or Precursor to "Hard Law"
First of all, non-binding instruments appear to be in many cases a
sheer necessity. As long as no directly applicable, legally binding
instruments specifically aimed at the behavior or TNCs will be adopted
by states, nor existing international and national laws reformed to this
effect, the rationalist perspective is to see "soft law" as the alternative. 47
The large and diverse array of non-legal instruments may simply be the
best attainable means to govern TN Cs.
A binding international
45. The normativity of "hard law" also remains to a large extent a mystery. See
generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Mystery of Legal Obligation, 3 INT'L THEORY 319
(2011).
46. See generally Jean d'Aspremont, The Politics ofDeformalization in International
Law, 3 GOETTrNGEN J. INT'L L. 503 (2011).
47. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 722
(2010).
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agreement to govern TNCs directly is indeed unlikely in the foreseeable
future, 48as many states and much of the private sector continue to resist
the idea for the reasons and with the means explained below. At the
same time, however, a certain willingness to adopt instruments of a
voluntary character can be observed.
A related point is to see soft instruments as precursors to formal
agreements. In a situation where an outright formal agreement is
politically unattainable, other types of instruments can be used as
intermediate steps towards it. These alternative instruments may be
used to, for example, experiment with a new rule or to innovatively
encourage changes in the behavior of relevant actors. Exposure to the
new ideas will, the theory assumes, prepare the regulators and
regulatees up to a point where they are ready to take the ultimate step
towards "hard law."49 This is relatively common in areas with
considerable (scientific) uncertainty regarding the optimal contents and
effects of the policies in tackling a particular problem. 50 However, this
type of precursory role for soft instruments is relatively weak in areas
where the obstacles to "hard law" are political, rather than relate to
uncertainty.
Finally, soft law instruments may be seen as a necessity also from
the perspective of non-state actors, in case they themselves act as
regulators: these parties obviously do not even have the direct means to
develop classic "hard law."

B. Unique Qualities of "Soft Law" -A Complement to "Hard
Law"
Soft law instruments often are unique in terms of their versatility,
scope and/or "depth." The large number of different kinds of soft
instruments means that they are many times aimed much more
48. The last attempt, the 'Norms on Responsibility' did not make it above the level of
a sub-commission of the Human Rights Council. See, e.g., De Feyter, supra note 15, at 8182. And the more recent UN Guiding Principles make explicit that they are not intended as
the precursor to a binding international agreement. See Rep. of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the U.N. Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., Guiding Principles

on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and
Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (John Ruggie), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17 .31.pdf [hereinafter Guiding
Principles].
49. HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 28 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds.,
2004).
50. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learningfrom Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
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specifically at the problems caused by the activities of TNCs than are
formally binding instruments. They may be used to address TNC
behavior in more elaborate detail than, for instance, international human
rights conventions, which have an evident legacy as acts aimed
primarily at state behavior and rarely are very specific as to what
amounts to proper or improper behavior. It seems important also for
these reasons to gauge whether and how this large body of instruments
may actually alleviate the policy void on TNCs.
Another, interlinked argument is that soft instruments possess
different qualities than formal international law. Many policy tools
work in ways that are not dependent upon the core characteristic of
"hard law," which is to create legally binding rights and obligations on
parties. Constructivists, in particular, argue that soft law can promote
discursive, experimentalist processes that can transform the way norms
are perceived and created. 51 Such means may even be preferable from
the perspective of responsive governance. 52 In comparison with rules
that need to go through the entire legislative or treaty-making process,
they may also be much faster to set up and to flexibly change
afterwards. But whether and how exactly such "soft law" could
complement "hard law" is precisely the question that deserves further
clarification. This is all the more so, considering that soft instruments
may even be inevitable or inherent in the phenomenon of globalization.
According to Nijman and Nollkaemper, "[o]ne of the challenges that
globalization poses to legal theory is precisely the emergence of 'nonState' legal orders, and the resulting need for a conceptual framework
which enables our discipline to accommodate different legal cultures." 53
In other words, these instruments may correctly reflect the fact that the
activities of TN Cs are of such a special kind that they warrant a unique
approach.
As noted, if TNCs, non-governmental organization
("NGOs"), and other non-state parties act themselves as rule makers in
51. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 722.
52. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1019-20 (2004).
53. Beyond the Divide, in NEWPERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL LAW 341, 349 (James Nijman & Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2007)
(paraphrasing WILLIAM TWINrNG, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 51 (Butterworths
2000)) ("Today, a picture of law in the world must deal with a much more complex picture
involving established, resurgent, developing, nascent and potential forms of legal ordering."
Id. Twining furthermore asks: "[c]an public international law, as traditionally conceived,
cope adequately with such problems as environment, international crime, and basic human
needs or rights at the global level?"); see also Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private
Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (2013).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/5

20

2015]

Kalimo and Staal: "Softness" in International Instruments: The Case of Transnationa

Softness and Transnational Corporations

383

these transnational normative orders, then there may not even be any
other choice but to resort to soft instruments. TNCs and NGOs simply
do not have the capacity under international law to make legal
instruments, nor are they directly subjects of international law.

C. Counter-productive Uses of Soft Law - The Antagonist
Approach
Shaffer and Pollack claim that all three principle schools of
thought that address the strengths and weaknesses of soft law and "hard
law"-positivists, 54 rationalists, 55 and constructivists 56-tend to see
them as alternatives or mutually supporting complements. 57 These
authors raise doubts about the proposition that new soft instruments are
always adopted with a view to decreasing the policy void. More
attention should be paid to "soft law" as an antagonist to "hard law," 58
because it frequently leads to inconsistencies and conflicts among
norms. Or worse, this may have been the aim from the outset. The
antagonistic behavior has specific implications in a fragmented legal
system, resulting in a strategic hardening of "soft law" regimes and
softening of hard-law regimes, or in a pre-emption of "hard law"
through "soft law." These kinds of situations arise under conditions of
distributive conflicts between states and in regime complexes, in
particular. 59 They also fit well the notion of legal pluralism, where
numerous heterogeneous legal orders coexist, interact and compete
without clear hierarchies. 60 "Soft law" in this sense is inevitably a part
54. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT'L. 381
( 1998); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413 (1983).
55. See, e.g., Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45
INT'L ORGS. 495 (1991); Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 579 (2005); ANDREW GUZMAN, How [NTERNAT[ONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONALIST CHOICE THEORY (2010); Kai Raustiala, Form and Substance in International
Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).
56. See, e.g., David Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law," "Hard Law,"
and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity, in LA w AND NEW GOVERNANCE
IN THE EU AND THE US 65 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
57. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 707-08.
58. This argument has been made by others before, albeit in a less comprehensive way.
For example, NGOs, who have long held this position, oppose voluntary instruments in part
because they tend to bring hard law" negotiations to a standstill.
59. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 709, 728.
60. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi & Pai vi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT. L. 553 (2002); Roderick A. MacDonald, Metaphors
of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes, and Legal Pluralism, 69 ARrz. J. INT. & COMP. L. 75
( 1998).
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of globalization.
D. Interactions Between "Soft Law" and "Hard Law"
The last-mentioned, antagonistic perspectives on "soft law" are not
at the core of this paper, which focuses on the ability of "soft law" to fill
the void left by "hard law." It is nevertheless important to realize,
following Shaffer and Pollack that "hard law" and soft law are not in a
binary either/or relationship. Rather, their interaction is one where
specific conditions are conducive to making the actors employ them as
alternatives, complements, or antagonists. 61 This paper strives to
contribute to the discourse by exploring the notion of softness and how
that characteristic may reflect in the choice of the instrument in each
individual case. The analysis leads to observations about how on
occasion, neither a hard nor soft type of an instrument is able to fill a
policy void, and that a focus on "soft law" may in fact only be leading
the attempts astray.

lll. FROM THE DEFICIENT NOTION OF "SOFT LAW"
TOWARDS AN ACCURATE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
SOFTNESS
In order to understand whether "soft law" instruments may succeed
in alleviating the policy void in governing TNCs, and if so, how, it is
next pertinent to define in more detail what "soft law" actually means.
As the analysis below will reveal, the term "soft law" is rather
problematic: there seem to be more suitable terms than "soft law" to
describe instruments that are not part of "hard law" in the classic sense
of the term. The terminological analysis will lead to a conceptualization
of instruments, which is believed to be more instructive for
understanding their key characteristics in terms of "softness." With the
tool, the suitability of a number of leading human rights and
environmental instruments that govern TNCs may then be analyzed in
the ensuing Section IV.
A. Definitional Deficiencies of "Soft Law"
1. An Incorrect Concept
The instruments looked at in this paper have often been grouped
together under a single concept: "soft law." "Soft law" is widely used
61. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 709.
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as a concept to denote all normative instruments that do not amount to
classic "hard law." As Jan Klabbers, a staunch critic of the concept, has
submitted
[w ]e tend to use the term soft law in order to describe things which are
difficult to describe as hard law. Thus, guidelines, codes of conduct,
resolutions, recommendations and action programs, indeterminate
provisions of treaties, unratified conventions, perhaps even the
opinions of advocates general or dissenting opinions of individual
judges of the ICJ or the various human rights courts, they may all
perhaps be qualified as 'soft law.' Clearly they are not hard law;
clearly they are not totally irrelevant either, so voila: soft law it must
be. 62

Klabbers and some other international legal scholars denounce the
idea that law can be "soft." "As soon as soft law is to be applied to any
specific set of circumstances, it collapses into either 'hard law,' or no
law at all." 63 In a binary world of law and non-law, soft law as an inbetween is incorrect: there either are or are not normative obligations
that are created when the law is applied ex post. The "soft" part of the
concept creates confusion from another perspective. It glosses over the
fact that many "soft instruments" have direct effects on the behavior of
states, TN Cs, and other actors, and they have indirect legal effects by
transforming subsequently into formal international law. Mechanisms
often employed by "soft law," such as economic incentives and
reputational costs, can be much more compulsory than the term soft
would indicate. They may be more effective than "hard law" itself, as
some of the authors noted in Section II have suggested.
As for the 'law' part of the concept, it seems rather odd to use it
where states or international organizations have usually quite
purposefully chosen "an instrument that lies outside the realm of law,"
and have thus indicated their specific intention "not to legally commit
themselves." 64 Using the term "law" for something that is adopted
explicitly as something other than law threatens to blur the "normativity
threshold." This is so in particular if and when there is a point of
transition between law and non-law, between what does and does not
constitute a legal norm. 65

62. Klabbers, supra note 54, at 385.
63. Id. at 382.
64. Jean d' Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New
Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT. L. 1075, 1081-82 (2008) (emphasis added).
65. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2000); Weil, supra note 54, at 415.
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2. Too Generic a Concept
While soft law may be inaccurate as a concept, it also seems much
too generic to properly guide our understanding regarding the very
different nature, properties, and normativity of the various instruments
relating to TNCs and their behavior. As long as there are soft and hard
ends to the spectrum of instruments, it seems inevitable that there are
also shades of softness and hardness in between. At the very least, there
must be such spectrums from softer to harder within the two binary
categories of law and other instruments. A sharp binary categorization
seems unlikely to be helpful in explaining all the legal as well as nonlegal instruments, each with their different characteristics. This is so
especially for legal instruments with soft dimensions and for non-legal
instruments with hard dimensions. There is no denying the growing
disaggregation of power into myriad spheres of authority, which may
not (fully) be public authorities and that deliver formal and informal
rules and norms of various kinds. 66 There is considerable variance,
whichever way one may wish to create categories. 67 This is certainly so
with respect to instruments addressing the behavior of TN Cs.
Although it is thus not possible to describe all such variance with a
single term "soft law," it would seem equally unadvisable to limit the
use of the term to only a clear but narrow sub-group among the
variance. In this latter case, there is likely to exist a more accurate
descriptive term than "soft law" to explain the instruments in question.
Therefore, a simple dichotomy between "hard law" and "soft law"
(and also between law and "non-law") alone seems too stiff and
inaccurate to be useful for fully understanding the instruments, which
the terms intend to cover. 68 It remains important to maintain that binary
distinction, because in some contexts-such as domestic or international
adjudication-the legal status of an instrument continues to be relevant

66. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques
and Politics, 70 Moo. L. REV. 1 (2007); James Rosenau, Governing the Ungovernable: The
Challenge of Global Disaggregation ofAuthority, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 88, 88 (2007).
67. Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Antto Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and
Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soji Power: An Analytical Framework, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 400, 401 (2009).
68. Laszlo Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soji Law, 59
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 605, 611 (2010); Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity:
From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority, 9
GERMAN L.J. 1865, 1869 (2008) (Goldmann remarked that the term "soft law" is not much
more than a slightly more elegant way of saying "underconceptualized law." Accordingly,
he continues, we should use formal criteria to divide it into subspecies, each with its own
characteristics).
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for its softness or hardness. Yet it also seems vital to understand norms
to be on a continuum with a lot of diversity along numerous other
variables. 69
One may thus agree with d' Aspremont that a binary approach to
law is not in conflict with the growing complexity of regulatory tools in
contemporary international relations. 70 A binary division may be
maintained, but while distinguishing e.g. the different regulatory
choices and the gradations of normativity in the language that are
available for both legal and non-legal norms. The nuance and the
binary approach are not mutually exclusive. 71

B. The Lay of the Land in the Theory of "Soft Law"
Numerous attempts have been made to make sense of "soft law."
Problematic in these approaches has been the disregard for the idea of
maintaining the binary distinction in parallel with the more fluid
characterizations. The empirical basis of the attempts has also often
been wanting. 72 This Section highlights the views of authors that appear
the most insightful, and which therefore have served as the basis in this
paper for developing the methodology for assessing "soft law."

1. The Three Dimensions of Softness
Amongst the most quoted authors in describing "soft law" are
Abbott et al., who have proposed a continuum of legalization, 73 where
the softness or hardness of legalization may be measured in terms of the
"obligation, precision and delegation" of the measure. 74 Obligation
means the (legally or otherwise) binding nature of the rule; precision
reflects the ability of the rule to unambiguously define conduct; and
delegation refers to the extent to which an implementing and

69. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 402; see also DANIEL
80DANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100-01, 106-07
(2010) (emphasizing the importance of both legal status, as well as various other
characteristics).
70. d' Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1075.
71. Cf Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 167, 180
(1996) ("law itself, for all its binariness, is capable of reflecting a whole spectre of subtleties
and nuances; . . . law itself can accommodate various shades of grey without losing its
binary character").
72. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 401.
73. These authors define legalization as "global regulation through diverse types of
norms." Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401
(2000).
74. Id.
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interpretive authority has been defined. 75 Taking these three dimensions
seriously, most international instruments, including those on the 'law'
side of the binary distinction, seem soft in many respects. 76 This is
certainly true of global environmental and human rights treaties with
their many indeterminate provisions and limited delegation to third
parties.
To be more specific, the dimension of "obligation" is dependent on
the mandatory, normative-Abbott et al. use "binding"-nature of the
rule. Obligation seems to be a concept with multiple meanings. It may
indicate especially the mandatory quality of the language of the
instrument. The authority of the actors that adopted the instrument, or a
more general sentiment of obligation caused by the legitimacy of the
instrument is also central. Obligation thus can be linked to the concept
author, which Neil Komesar finds important from an institutional
perspective. 77 As he has suggests, the implications of a policy may
differ greatly according to the author.
"Precision," the second dimension proposed by Abbott et al.,
measures the extent that "that rules unambiguously define the conduct
they require, authorize, or proscribe." 78
The third dimension,
"delegation," reminds us that not only the authority of the adopting
entitles matters. The instrument's implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation are quite relevant. 79 It needs to be determined who, if
anyone, is in charge, and how much authority is being delegated.
The approach of Abbott and Snidal to instrument choice, which
builds on these three dimensions of legalization, emphasizes the role of
different types of legalization in the instrumentalist hands of powerful
states. 8 For example, Chinkin's categories of "soft law" reflect these
three dimensions. 81 Weakening one or more of the dimensions turns

°

75. Id.
76. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'LORG. 421, 422 (2000).
77. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-5 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1994).
78. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
79. The relevance of delegation to the normativity of international norms was already
stressed in Lauterpacht's critical analysis of the auto-interpretive character of international
law, or what he called "self-judging obligations." See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (Oxford Univ. Press
1933).
80. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 76, at 421.
81 . Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 850 (1989). The degree of legalization (as
defined by Abbot et al. 's obligation, precision and delegation) is the independent variable,
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legal arrangements conveniently into "soft law" or vice versa. This is
essential from the perspective of governance, because TNCs may be
able to exert pressure towards the governing authorities on the types of
instruments that will be created.

2. Softness v. Effectiveness
It may be noted that Abbott et al. deliberately avoid assessing the
instruments' effects, as that would conflate delegation with effective
action. 82 Also in the analysis of this paper, effectiveness is understood
as conceptually distinct from softness; the two must be evaluated
separately. While softness refers to low levels of obligation, precision,
and delegation seems to correlate negatively with effectiveness, the
interrelationship between the two appears rather complex and casespecific. 83 There are many intervening external factors, such as the
degree of stakeholder agreement on the issue, reputational risks, and
potential fringe benefits of compliance. Softness is not a conditio sine
qua non of ineffectiveness, nor is hardness a prerequisite of
effectiveness, even if the former usually increases the latter. 84 Indeed,
soft measures can be effective, otherwise the prospect of them acting as
alternatives to "hard law" would not materialize. Similarly, there would
be no need to complement or replace "hard law" if it could not be
ineffective. Thus, by not conflating softness and effectiveness, the
analysis of the instruments of governance remains more detailed and
transparent on the surface. The focus of this paper is precisely on this
softness aspect.
Karlsson-Vinkhyuzen and Vihma take a similar view in their
comparison of international norms: softness is the independent variable,
while effectiveness, together with legitimacy, emerge as the central,
overarching dependent variables. 85
effectiveness and legitimacy the dependent variables in determining softness. See Abbott et
al., supra note 73.
82. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
83. See, e.g., Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 414; Jean-Marie
Kamatali, The New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' Contribution in
Ending the Divisive Debate over Human Rights Responsibilities of Companies: Is it Time
for an /CJ Advisory Opinion?, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 437, 449-50 (2012);
Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 43-45 (2012); Deborah E. Rupp & Cynthia A. Williams, The Efficacy
of Regulation as a Function of Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law
Continuum, 12 THEO. INQ. L. 581, 594-95 (2011).
84. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 414.
85. Id. at 401-03. Their approach thus is wide as it relies on both rationalist and
constructivist theories to cover, respectively, the utilitarian political economy aspects and
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3. lnstrumentum and Negotium
d' Aspremont proposes on the basis of the theory of legal acts that
in contemporary international law, it is either the instrumentum (the
"container") or the negotium (the "content") that can be softened. 86 The
softness of the instrumentum thus pertains to the choice of an instrument
outside the realm of law, defined as formal treaties or binding unilateral
declarations. 87 A soft instrumentum can also produce legal effects, such
as interpretative guidelines of other legal acts, or even customary law in
the long run. However, being such legal fact, capable of creating legal
effects, is according to d' Aspremont not sufficient to qualify it as a legal
act. The latter creates effects only at the explicit will of its authors,
hence the distinction to "hard law. " 88
As for the negotium (the content) of a legal act, it can also be softer
or harder. Soft, non-normative content does not produce rules that
would commit the subjects. The negotium of a legal act can be softened
without invalidating it or transforming it to a legal fact. 89 The softness
of the negotium will not affect the status of the instrument as law. It
will, however, reduce law's ability to oblige the parties, reflecting on
the obligation and precision dimensions of Abbot et al.
Blutman takes a similar approach using the notions of legal
(formal) source and the substance of the norm. 90 He further notes that
current studies group "soft law" into three categories: ( 1) non-binding
decisions of international organisations, (2) non-obligatory agreements
of states, and (3) recommendations of non-state parties (NGOs). 91 In
the first two groups, the softness emanates from what d' Aspremont
called the negotium - the lack of obligation of the non-binding content
the culturo-anthropological aspects of the issue. See id. at 401-03. Effectiveness is for these
authors interdependent with legitimacy, and they both consist of numerous components. See
id. at 403-04. Effectiveness can be understood as the degree to which the set policy
objective is achieved as a consequence of the measure. See id. at 405. Note the difference
between effectiveness and compliance. See Kai Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions,
in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 659-708 (Kai Raustiala, David G. Victor & Eugene
Skolnikoff eds., 1998). Also note the difference between behavioral effectiveness and
problem-solving effectiveness. See Arild Underdal, One Question, Two Answers, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS: CONFRONTING THEORY WITH EVIDENCE 3 (Miles
Edward et. al eds., 2002).
86. d' Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1084.
87. Id. at 1084-85.
88. Id. at 1084-87.
89. Id. at I 084.
90. Blutman, supra note 68, at 606.
91. Id. at 607-08.
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of the norm. In the third group, softness is caused by the instrumentum
and the legislating party. Blutman does not consider the authority of the
author, and indeed probably not the delegation or the instrumentum
either. Moreover, neither precision, effectiveness, nor legitimacy are
directly relevant in this type of categorization. The strength of
categorizations such as Blutman' s, lies in their simplicity and ease of
application, as well as the direct link to existing types of instruments.

C. Making Use of the "Soft Law Theories"
It would seem that the above selection of approaches to "soft law"
have varying degrees of explanatory power. Many of them consist of
dimensions that from the perspective of softness constitute continuums
rather than either/or type binary choices. A careful combination of the
dimensions, whether continuums or not, appears to be a useful way to
better conceptualize "soft law" and to understand specific cases of
instruments' softness in international governance.
It seems possible to combine the assessments of softness along
many such dimensions onto a single, summarizing scale. A summary
value of softness may be useful in providing an overview of the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with. It might even
be possible to define a point, a dividing line between soft and hard,
similar to that which we recognize between law and "non-law." One
may wonder, however, to what extent such a point is actually relevant.
First of all, all instruments, be they soft or hard in the end, are in any
event analyzed along the same dimensions of softness, just as water
may be measured for its coldness/hotness. But like water, is there a
metaphysical "melting point" where the definition of an instrument
changes from hard to soft in a way that would represent a drastic change
in its qualities, like (solid, hard) ice changes into (liquid, soft) water?
Most of the instruments are likely to have some degree of
softness/hardness anyway; only at the extremes are instruments entirely
hard or soft.
Second, it seems important to perceive that any such dichotomy
between soft and hard is indeed only a summary of many aspects. It
appears more relevant to understand what the constitutive dimensions of
each summary value of softness in a particular case may be, in
particular on those dimensions that are close to the extreme ends of the
scales. This is so especially as regards the "instrumentum." On the one
hand, there are legal instruments, which in the context of international
governance consist of the formal sources of international law:
conventions, customary law and binding decisions of international
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organizations. On the other hand, there are non-legal instruments,
which are all the other international or transnational public or private
instruments that are not formal sources of international law. 92 A hard
instrumentum thus refers to formal "law," while a soft instrumentum
means that one is not dealing with law. This in tum implies that to
qualify as soft an instrument that in terms of its instrumentum
dimension is "hard (law)", it would need to rank quite low (soft) on
many if not all other dimensions. Conversely, to consider a non-legal
(and thus prima facie soft) instrument as hard, 93 it would need to rank
high across many, if not all, dimensions beyond the instrumentum. A
precise obligation by an authoritative NGO with strong oversight on the
implementation could perhaps achieve such hardness in a soft
ins trumentum.
Third, an understanding of softness as relative and measured
against the same criteria for all kinds of instruments, whether formal
law or something else, is important. As could be seen in the discussion
in Section II on the voids left by (international) "hard law" in governing
TNCs, various types of instruments may have important roles to play.
Perhaps an instrument is not just a second best solution in a particular
case
or for particular ends within that case
but indeed the best, or
even the only means of achieving a policy outcome?94 The situation for
which the instrument is intended needs to be analyzed along the same
dimensions to know what type of an instrument is required.
Finally, there is still an important aspect from the viewpoint of the
instruments' functioning that could be called systemic coherence. It
relates closely to the above points noted by Shaffer and Pollack: all
legal and non-legal instruments, whether hard or soft, also affect one
another. Indeed, as was described above, soft instruments are often
seen as an alternative or complement to international "hard law."
Treaties can generate secondary (delegated) rules that may be non-legal.
Treaties can harden existing non-legal instruments, and non-legal
instruments may not only be an alternative or complement to legal
instruments, but also soften them. Non-legal instruments may even
become antagonists that work directly against treaties, as Shaffer and
Pollack have pointed out. 95
92. Guzman, supra note 55, at 580 (noting that a categorical difference between harder
and softer types of governance is created here).
93. Blutman, supra note 68, at 612 (noting that it is a common misconception that nonbinding "soft law" would influence less the actions of a state than a binding norm).
94. See id. at section 3.
95. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 788-96. This would seem to imply that the
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The types of conceptualizations portrayed in this Section can be
useful when the hardness/softness of multiple instruments, both legal
and non-legal, is assessed comparatively against one another. As
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma point out, the development of a legal
or non-legal instrument, and subsequently its qualities as a "harder" or
"softer" instrument in global governance, is only one variable in the
evolution that determines the long-term policy outcome. 96 Moreover,
the choice as often explained involves a highly complex set of
interrelated, time- and place-specific variables and impacts. This
touches the very core of modem politics that struggles to address the
dynamics of globalism.

D. Towards a More Accurate Conceptualization of Softness in
Instruments
Linguistic conventions such as "soft law" are difficult to fight
against. 97 Political scientists make the observation that "[a] few
international institutions and issue-areas approach the theoretical ideal
of hard legalization, but most international law is soft in distinct
ways. " 98 The proposal here is to take the above-noted dimensions of
softness, fine-tune them, and use them to describe the instruments more
accurately. The assumption is that such a systemization/categorization
may be helpful to the understanding of policy instruments,
distinguishing, for example, between their softness and effectiveness. 99

effectiveness of an instrument could even be negative from the perspective of the policy
objective: it decreases rather than increases the ability to reach the set policy goal. This is
an important aspect explaining the reasons behind the existence of a legal void in TNC
governance. As was explained earlier, the void on TNCs is in part created by their ability to
influence law making at various levels of governance. An important way to do so is to swap
from the role of a subject of international norms to that of an author of international
(private) norms by creating alternative (non-legal) norms that are antagonistic to the
objectives of prevailing legal instruments, or to other public instruments such as decisions of
international organizations or joint declarations of states. In other words, if we were to
measure the effectiveness of antagonistic instruments, a scale would need to continue from
"weekly positive" and "none" onto a "negative," when the point of reference are the
prevailing policy objectives rather than the alternative or direct objective of the law or other
instrument in question. Because this paper focuses on ways to fill in the voids left by "hard
law", the antagonistic aspects of non-legal instruments are however, not discussed further.
Id.
96. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 400, 40 l.
97. Blutman, supra note 68, at 605.
98. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 76, at 421.
99. Obviously, there is likely to be overlap between the dimensions. A similar
pragmatic approach is taken by Shaffer and Pollack. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47,
at 714.
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It is further proposed here that each of these dimensions of softness
of Abbott et al. (obligation, precision, and delegation) be specified a
step further into a few more accurate, particularly significant subdimensions. The proposed sub-dimensions improve the tool, because
their values seem especially instructive for the processes being studied
in this paper: the behavior of TNCs. 100
The "obligation" dimension is perhaps the most ambiguous. As
indicated above, it seems that Abbott et al. 101 equates "obligation" with
"legal obligation." Such a definition of obligation would, however, not
clearly distinguish the dimension from (i.e. would limit it to) the
concept of instrumentum. The hard v. soft instrumentum distinction in
this paper makes a difference between two types of public instruments:
those that are and those that are not (formal) law. Only formal sources
of law oblige in the hardest sense of legally binding the parties and
being capable of enforcement through judicial means. These qualities
could be qualified as sub-dimensions of obligation. However, because
of the importance of the either/or type binary distinction between what
is or is not a legally binding formal source of law, it seems appropriate
to turn them into a dimension of their own. Jnstrumentum must
therefore be lifted out of the obligation dimension.
The obligatory nature of the instrument, however, also appears to
depend on the authority of the "author" of the instrument and on its
mandatory quality. These should be the focus of the obligation
dimension. First, the authority sub-dimension of obligation reflects the
authority of the author over the addressees of the instrument. Some
institutions that adopt instruments on TNC behavior have more
authority over TNC behavior than others. There are various factors on
which such authority may be based. Authority will depend upon
whether there has been some grant of authority from the addressees of
the instrument to the author. It also turns on the involvement of experts
during the drafting, the perceived quality of the instrument, and whether
the process leading to the text has allowed for consultations with the
addressees. In other words, the relationship between the authors and the
constituency of the instrument matters. This also explains why a single
institution ("author") may have authority in one specific case, but less
so in another. A higher level of authority will make the instrument
more obliging, and hence harder, regardless of its public or private
character.
100. See Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 403 .
101. Id. at 401.
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Instruments created by the addressees themselves are usually
referred to as self-regulation, distinguishing them from other private
rulemaking by third parties. It is difficult to generalize whether a rule to
which specific private parties (such as TNCs) have committed
themselves is more obligatory or less obligatory than that created by
some other private parties without the involvement and/or assent of the
former (i.e. TNCs). Some NGOs are more highly regarded by TNCs
than others in terms of their expertise or trustworthiness, whereas others
may be more feared because of their effective publicity campaigns. All
such factors influence whether TNCs regard instruments to be
authoritative. It would also seem important to extend the obligation
dimension to the negotium, the contents of the instrument. A legal
instrumentum can contain a negotium devoid of any obligatory
language, such as "shall." At the same time, a non-legal instrumentum
can contain a negotium that is worded in unmistakably mandatory
terms. 102 The provisions of both legal and non-legal instruments can
attempt to guide the behavior of their addressees "in a stronger or
weaker fashion." 103 The obligation dimension hence would seem to
consist of two sub-dimensions: authority and the mandatory nature of
the instrument.
Also, the precision dimension would, at least with regard to the
particular subject matter of TNCs, seem to be improved if divided into
two sub-dimensions. Abbott et al.' s concept of precision related to the
object of the rule ratione materiae: "that rules unambiguously define
the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe." 104 This is the
accuracy of the instrument. But precision would also seem to include
the specificity of an instrument towards certain actors or issues.
Softness or hardness of an instrument in terms of a certain group of
actors such as TNCs, also depends on whether the rules specifically
address that group. The softness, in other words, is influenced also by
the scope of the instrument ratione personae. A narrow, specific scope
increases hardness especially in the international context, where the
absence of an institutional framework moves the ex post interpretation
and application of general rules to the hands of the actors to be
governed-the TNCs, in this case, and also states within whose
jurisdiction the TNCs act. 105 The precision dimension therefore is
102. See generally Anthony Aust, Alternatives to Treaty-Making: MO Us as Political
Commitments, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 46, 46-72 (Duncan. B. Hollis ed., 2012).
103. BODANSKY, supra note 69, at 103.
104. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 414.
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enhanced by including the sub-dimension of "specificity" in addition to
what could be redefined as its "accuracy."
Finally, delegation 106 concerns primarily the question of how much
of the authority to implement and enforce the instrument is delegated to
others, how much is retained by the author of the instrument, and how
much simply remains undetermined.
Delegation to third parties
increases hardness, and is vital where precision in terms of specificity is
low. 107 Delegation of interpretive authority is a variety of delegation
that links back directly to accuracy, i.e. precision ratione materiae.
Furthermore, the softness of the delegation also appears to depend
on to whom exactly the authority is delegated, i.e. the authorship of the
delegated acts. Close ties, even a shared identity amongst those
authorized to implement the instrument and those addressed by it soften
the delegation dimension. Delegation is harder when an auditor or
NGOs enforce the instrument, than where the TNCs, as the subjects of
the instrument, enforce their own rules. It is also important to
distinguish between delegation in rule-making and dispute settlement
(i.e. judicial) functions. 108
To sum up, the tool proposed here incorporates the following
dimensions of softness:
the instrumentum (formal source oflaw v. other instruments)
obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language)
precision (accuracy and specificity), and
delegation (extent and authority of delegation).
These softness-related dimensions measure only specific qualities
of the instrument. They may be combined and may interact with
numerous other qualities of the instruments, such as how quickly they
can be enacted, how representative they are, etc. A discussion on the
qualities of the instrument itself also easily merges into a discussion on
the impacts that the instruments have. International lawyers and legal
scholars often concentrate on compliance, while political scientists
assess, for example, the effectiveness, dynamic and static efficiency,
legitimacy and administrative burden of the instrument, with a clear
106. "Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement,
interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules." Id.
at 401.
107. See id. at 415-18
108. See id. at 408-10.
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Mitchell convincingly argues that
emphasis on effectiveness. 109
compliance is only a subset of effectiveness, and indeed from the
perspective of this paper it is the final policy outcome-a change in the
environmental and human rights behavior of TNCs-that is relevant. 110
As this paper specifically addresses the question of the aptness of "soft
law" instruments to govern TNCs, the effectiveness of instruments thus
is a relevant, yet limited part of the analysis. It is worth repeating that
softness and effectiveness are separate but interrelated issues, and that
only softness-related qualities are analyzed in this article; the other
qualities of the instruments are not assessed. 111
The following tool emerges:

lnstr1tment1tm
Formal source of IL or not

Effectiveness

Obligation

Legitimacy

Authority, mandatory
language

Precision

Dynamic efficiency

Accuracy, specificity

Delegation
Extent, authority

Hard

Soft

Dimensions of "softness"

Low

High

Other qualities of instruments

Figure 1: Assessing "Softness" and Other Characteristics of
Instruments
The aspect of systemic coherence-the complementing, replacing,
precursory or antagonistic impacts that the instruments have against
each-seems worth bringing forth in some examples in view of the
earlier discussion. The coherence may be depicted as follows:

See generally RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE
146-80 (Sage 2010).
110. See id.; see generally Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67.
111. Qualities such as static and dynamic efficiency, and administrative burden, are
typically assessed.
109.

ENVIRONMENT
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Instrument 2

ls the overall policy mix
optimal?

Instrument 3

Are individual tools
optimal?
Instrument 4

Figure 2: Systemic Coherence of Soft Instruments

E. Applying the Tool to Public Legal Instruments, Public Non-

Legal Instruments and Private Instruments
In order to structure the application of the tool to particular
environmental and human rights instruments in Section IV, it is useful
to categorize the instruments in a preliminary fashion. First, as was
indicated in Section III (C), it is possible to distinguish between the
formal sources of international law (legal instrumentum) and the nonlegal or "soft" instrumentum. It is not implied that non-legal instruments
cannot bind actors politically, nor that they cannot be successful in
addressing a policy problem. The distinction simply reflects that such
instruments cannot legally bind states and in most cases cannot be
enforced through judicial means. Therefore, there are some good
reasons why non-legal instruments cannot operate in the same way as
legal instruments.
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Second, the broad non-legal category can be further sharpened 112
by separating public instruments from private instruments. 113 Three
broad categories of instruments can be identified 114 :
• Public Legal Instruments are the formal sources of
international law - i.e. the legal instrumentum within the context
of the international legal order - consist primarily of conventions,
customary law and binding decisions of international
organizations. These instruments are in the left column of Table
1, while non-legal instruments form the right column.
• Public Non-Legal Instruments include the output of
international organizations, two or more states collectively, or
even more loose gatherings of public officials (such as
collaborative networks), that are however not laid down as formal
international law. 115 "Public" thus denotes the centrality of public
actors: state representatives, intergovernmental organizations,
other public officials.
• Private lnstruments 116 in contrast include the output of
private or primarily private transnational initiatives, such as
guidelines or standards. A few instruments, such as the UN
Global Compact and other public-private partnerships, partly fit
under either category, public or private.
The distinction
public/private may be particularly relevant in the area of TNCs,
where the private authorship of an instrument usually points to
the involvement of either the regulated TNCs themselves or their
staunchest critics, NGOs. The difference between the Public
Non-Legal and Private (Non-Legal) Instruments (as well as the

112. See Blutman, supra note 68 , at 607-08.
113. Compare the IN-LAW project, which leaves private formal instruments outside of
its ambit. See generally INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKfNG (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses
Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., Oxford U. Press 2012).
114. These three groups are different from those distinguished by Blutman: the output
of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is part
of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 68, at 607-08.
115. Blutman distinguishes more categorically between state instruments and
instruments adopted by international organizations. However, because the adoption of
instruments within international organizations is heavily influenced by states a further
distinction would not seem useful or justifiable.
116. The type of private instruments that this article analyses are never legal
instruments, so that the addition 'non-legal' is superfluous. Private actors are of course
perfectly capable of adopting legal instruments in the form of private law contracts, but
those are outside the scope of this research.
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overlap between them) is highlighted with background shadings
in the right-hand column of Table 1 below.
The most noteworthy environmental and human rights instruments
can be grouped into these three categories of Public Legal Instruments,
Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private Instruments as shown in
Table 1 below:

Legal instrumentum
(Formal Sources of
International Law)

IV.A. Public Legal
Instruments

PUBLIC
(States and
IOs)

- ICCPR, ICESCR,
other human rights
treaties;
-Multilateral
Environmental
Agreements
- Security Council
Decisions

PUBLICPRIVATE
(Mix of States/
IOs and TNCs/
NGOs)

-

Non-legal
instrumentum
(Other than Formal
Sources of International '
Law)

IV.B. Public NonLegal Instruments
-UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human
Rights
-OECD Principles on
Multinational
Enterprises
-UNEP Guidelines 117
-UN Global Compact
-UN Business
Partnerships
-Equator Principles
-Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human
Rights

117. E.g., Charles Thomas, Tessa Tennant & Jon Rolls, The GHG Indicator: UNEP
Guidelines for Calculating Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Businesses and Non Commercial
Organizations
(2000),
available
at
http://www. unepfi .org/fileadmin/documents/ghg_indicator_2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
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IV.C. Private
Instruments
PRIVATE
(TN Cs)

PRIVATE
(NGOs)

Table 1. Categories
Instruments.

-

-Corporate Codes of
Conduct
-Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative

-Forest Stewardship
Council's Forest
Principles
-!SEAL Alliance-labels
-Social Accountability
International Standards
of Environmental and Human Rights

It seems that instruments belonging to different categories are
likely to denote certain recurring combinations of dimensions of
softness. These soft dimensions are marked in white in Figure 3
below, 118 although there may also of course be other soft characteristics,
as the analysis further below will clearly show.

118. The values of the other characteristics in the Figure are default values marked
only for the purposes of illustration.
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Public, Non-legal
Instruments

Private , Non-legal
Instruments

l 11strumentum

fnstrlll#N""'11t

Instrumentum

Formal source of lL or not

Formal source of IL or not

Potential
softness

Soft

Hard

Soft

Hard

Soft

Hard

Figure 3: Hypothetical Illustration of the "Softness" of Instruments
(white color indicates the sources of softness)

The possibility of such different dynamics of softness, as well as
different underlying explanations, justifies a separate analysis of
instruments from each of the three categories. The categories of Public
Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private
Instruments thus constitute Sections IV (A) through (C) in the
discussion that follows below.

IV. APPL YING THE CONCEPTUAL TOOL ON SOFTNESS
TO PRACTICAL CASES
In this Section, the conceptual tool created in the preceding Section
is applied to practical case examples on human rights and
environmental instruments that deal with TNCs. The approach has two
objectives. First, the tool's scores along the dimensions of softness
enable a sharper differentiation of the numerous instruments that apply
to TN Cs. Second, the application of the tool will allow for observations
of potential connections between the instrument's softness (both along
individual dimensions and overall) and how it operates. Ultimately, this
enables preliminary reflections on the relationship between (categories
of) instruments' softness and their effectiveness. It might even enable
the grouping of measures into some type of sub-categories on the basis
of their softness, as measured along the dimensions.
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The instruments that are to be analyzed have been selected for their
central place in the legal system for this area (Human Rights
Covenants), for their high profile (U.N. Guiding Principles, OECD
Guidelines) or their visibility towards the public (U.N. Global Compact,
Forest Stewardship Council). In the TNC context, instruments often
combine human rights with environmental protection.
As may be recalled from the previous Section, the preliminary
application of the tool grouped instruments into three general
categories, that are each discussed in the Sections that follow: Public
Legal Instruments (IV (A)), Public Non-Legal Instruments (IV (B)), and
Private Instruments (IV (C)). 119 The instruments have been chosen so
as to provide case examples that are representative of each of those
categories. 120 The selected instruments for each category will be
scrutinized along the (sub )dimensions of softness of the conceptual
tool-obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language);
precision (accuracy and specificity); and delegation (extent and
authority of delegation)-to add further nuance to the analysis.

A. Public Legal Instruments
1. General Observations
Instruments that are formal sources of international law- treaties
and binding decisions of international organizations- possess a legal
instrumentum, and have thereby specific characteristics compared to
non-legal instruments: only formal sources of law are capable of
creating obligations that are hard in the sense of being legally binding
and capable of enforcement through judicial means.
Most international law, aside from a few obligations under
customary law, is nonetheless not applicable to TNCs directly 121 as was
explained in Section I. Treaties and binding decisions of international
organizations also usually do not specifically address TNC behavior.
The hardness of the instrumentum of Public Legal Instruments is
therefore in the particular context of international governance not

119. A few of the examples amount to such an important participation of both private
and public actors that they may also be considered to constitute a separate public-private
category.
I 20. The first group, Public Legal Instruments, was already discussed in Section I to
establish the existence of a legal void. The observations in the following section on them
will therefore build upon the previous analysis in Section I.
I 21. NOLLKA EMP ER, supra note 22, at 58-59.
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equaled in the negotium part when measured along the dimensions of
creating obligations on TNCs and being specific in doing so.
Authority as a sub-dimension of "obligation" emanates in this
category of instruments from public authors, states and, to a much lesser
extent, international organizations. However, a state as a public
authority is not always authoritative as a rule maker, when it adopts
instruments to address its own behavior, the obliging authority of the
instrument is at the state's own discretion, and thus lower than when it
is set by a binding Security Council Chapter VII resolution. States also
do not have much authority over activities that take place outside their
jurisdictions, which is very relevant in the context of TNCs. This type
of exception therefore limits public authorities' power in terms of the
obligatory nature of the enacted instrument.
On the other (sub )dimensions in the tool, the softness of Public
Legal Instruments may in principle vary like it varies in all other types
of instruments. In the absence of direct obligations and likely poor
specificity, the tool places special emphasis on the delegation dimension
of international public law instruments. Are the implementing tasks
comprehensively delegated, and do the delegatee bodies possess the
necessary authority to oversee the process? It should be kept in mind
that because the states in any event need to act in-between the
international requirements and TNCs, there already are two steps in
applying international public law instruments.
The delegation
dimension of the tool shows how there is one further step to be taken
into account.
The state's implementing authority and responsibility to apply the
international provisions is often delegated to a public body such as a
ministry or agency. Although an actor other than the TNCs themselves,
the authority of the delegation is limited by the fact that it was these
very states that adopted the instruments in question, and they are
addressed to these very same states. The implementing and interpretive
authorities are in this sense not delegated to a truly independent actor.
The state's independent authority in the delegation will depend on many
factors, but there is often little in the instruments to guarantee it, and
much to restrain it. For example, the interests of the state may be too
close to that of the TNCs for it to exercise "independent" delegated
authority over the corporations. This holds true for host states, as the
Chevron case vividly illustrated, but also for home states, which may be
unwilling to constrain the operations of 'their" corporations abroad.
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Another problem is that international jurisdictional laws limit the
authority that is legally delegated to the home state. Home state organs
enforcing or adjudicating on 'their' corporations may rightly fear that
such extensive exercises of jurisdiction are for the most part prohibited
by international law. The Shell Nigeria case showed that even where a
home state judge declares itself competent, it may only be able to apply
the law of the host state, which in that case was far below the standards
prescribed by the home state. 122 Third, a state may be unlikely to
proactively enforce the rules, and will often only intervene if the victims
or their representatives bring a case against the state authorities. Local
inhabitants or vigilant NGOs may be required to force the state to
assume its role as the delegatee. An example is again the Chevron case,
where only a decades-long effort by interest groups was able to move
the case forward.
Truly relevant delegation would mean third party oversight over
the states' performance of their delegated tasks with regard to TNCs.
The following sections will show that such oversight is nevertheless
often deficient on all levels: national, regional as well as international.
In conclusion, the delegation sub-dimension is rather soft for many
Public Legal Instruments on TNCs.
A tentative picture can thus already be envisaged before applying
the tool to provisions of particular Public Legal Instruments in areas of
human rights covenants and multilateral environmental agreements.
Public Legal Instruments are formally binding upon states that are
parties to them, but not upon TNCs nor do they generally contain
mandatory and precise requirements specifically about their behavior, or
delegation of oversight regarding state actions vis-a-vis TNCs. Public
Legal Instruments thus appear soft along all dimensions in their
application to TNCs. The conclusion seems almost counter-intuitive.
'Hard law' could leave a void in terms of TNCs because it is in fact not
hard at all.

2. The Human Rights Covenants
The human rights covenants, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), illustrate the
softness that may plague Public Legal Instruments in the field of human
rights. The Covenants amount only to what Knox calls a due diligence
122. See supra Section I (E)(3); Milieudefensie v. Dutch Royal Shell, Judgment (LJN:
BU3535) (2013).
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obligation, "an obligation of conduct and effort, not of result," 123
regarding human rights violations between private actors such as TNCs
and individual citizens. It is sufficient for the state governments to
satisfy their obligations to just take "reasonable steps" in trying to
prevent violations. Individual states and national legal orders retain
rather large discretion to determine appropriate measures.
Admittedly, the Human Rights Committee has commented that
states must protect individuals "also against acts committed by private
persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights
in so far as they are amenable to application between private parties or
entities." 124 But how exactly the rights apply to private actors, and
which actions are required of states in particular situations is left to the
states themselves to determine. Moreover, the General Comments of
the Covenant's bodies are not legally binding. Research conducted
under the UN Special Representative for business and human rights'
mandate shows that in practice, very few states actually have "special
policies, programs, or tools designed specifically to deal with corporate
human rights challenges." 125 The conclusion is that the "due diligence"
standard leads to a low level of obligation, and that the lack of accurate
guidance on which actions are a part of that due diligence standard
amounts to a low level of precision, both in terms of accuracy and
specificity.
As for the duties of home states to oversee that corporations based
within their jurisdiction respect human rights extra-territorially, the
Covenants are even more ambiguous: "The committees have not
expressly interpreted the treaties as requiring states to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over abuses committed abroad by
corporations domiciled in their territory. Nor however, do they seem to
regard the treaties as prohibiting such action, and in some situations
they have encouraged it." For example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has suggested that state parties take steps to
"prevent their own citizens and companies" from violating rights in
other countries. 126 Thus, the dimensions of obligation and precision
appear to be for home states even softer than for host states.
123. Knox, supra note 21, at 22.
124. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, para. 8, U.N . Doc.
CCPR/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
125. See Human Rights Council, Human Rights Policies and Management Practices:
Results from Questionnaire Surveys of Governments and the Fortune Global 500 Firms,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add. 3 (Feb. 28, 2007).
126. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 46th Sess. May 2-May 20,
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Is the softness of such low levels of obligation and prec1s10n
mitigated through oversight by third parties, delegation? The Human
Rights Committee ("HRC") and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (the "Human Rights Bodies") may be considered as
a kind of "secondary" delegatee: they monitor whether the states
complete their delegated task of providing horizontal protection. Such
interventions by the Human Rights Bodies will not be able to strengthen
the delegation much in practice, however, as it is widely acknowledged
that these U .N. bodies have only very limited powers. The so-called
'views' the HRC adopt in specific cases are non-binding as are the
General Comments of both committees.
Regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights,
have declared themselves incompetent to assert jurisdiction outside the
territory of the member states of the European Convention on Human
Rights, except where a member state exercises effective control, but this
is only possible in cases of either full occupation 127 or military action on
the ground. 128 In the developing regions, where the consequences of the
void are felt most, oversight mechanisms are much weaker. They are
practically absent in Asia, 129 while the African Court of Human and
Peoples' Rights is slowly starting to make use of its competences. 130
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights seems in this respect most
promising in the short term. However, the primary focus of all these
courts often is, or at least should be, in scrutinizing government's own
inappropriate conduct. Scrutiny of governmental oversight of corporate
conduct would seem a second-tier priority.
The Shell-Nigeria case implies that home state courts will at most
oversee that the state applies to national corporations the domestic law
of the host state, but not that it applies the ECHR or the ICCPR. The

2011, U.N . Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 para. 5.
127. See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 731, para. 76 (2001);
see Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, para. 62 (1995).
128. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18,
para. 110 (2011 ).
129. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has as
of yet no real judicial powers. See James Munro, The Relationship Between the Origins and
Regime Design of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR),
15 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 1185, 1185 (2011).
130. A first decision was issued on 15 December 2009, in the matter of Michelot
Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, 001/2008, AFR. CT. H.R. See Chacha Bhoke
Murungu, Judgment in the First Case Before the African Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights: A Missed Opportunity or a Mockery of International Law in Africa?, 3 J. AFR. &
INT'L L. 187 (2010).
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OECD National Contact Points are a very modest attempt to oversee
human rights violations outside ECHR territory. The Contact Points fall
in this paper under the next category of Public Non-Legal Instruments.
These examples are well aligned with the conclusions of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur. States seem to escape effective oversight by other
delegated bodies, irrespective of the level of governance.

3. Environmental Agreements
The previous discussion on Public Legal Instruments in the field of
human rights indicated that these tools often lack in terms of their
obligation, precision and delegation.
International environmental
agreements may however be used to illustrate that such deficiencies are
not an unavoidable characteristic of Public Legal Instruments, but rather
a consequence of more or less deliberate choices in constructing the
instruments. In other words, hardness is also possible to achieve in
international law. The International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (the "CLC Convention") 1992 131provides an
instructive example. The CLC Convention is an international maritime
treaty that was adopted to ensure that adequate compensation is
available for oil pollution damage caused by accidents of oil tankers. 132
Article IX of the Convention states that "[ e ]ach Contracting State shall
ensure that its Courts possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain such
actions for compensation."
The convention is extremely precise and framed in mandatory
terms. It reads almost like an insurance contract. 133 Paradoxically, as
131. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Civil
Liability Convention, (CLC)), INT'L MARITIME 0RG. (Nov. 29, 1969), available at
http://www. imo .org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/lntemati onalConvention-on-Ci vil-Liability-for-Oi 1-Poll ution-Damage-( C LC) .aspx (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
132. Id.
133. For example, paragraphs 1-3 of Article V state:
The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in
respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount calculated as follows:
(a)4,5 l 0,000 units of account for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage;
(b)for a ship with a tonnage in excess there of, for each additional unit of
tonnage, 631 units of account in addition to the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph
(a);
provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed
89,770,000 units of account.
The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is
proved that the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission,
committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge
that such damage would probably result.
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the text of for example the Preamble and Articles III and V of the
Convention show a central aim of the Convention is in fact to limit the
liability of the ship owners. A number of scholars indeed criticize the
way in which a regime, which was meant to establish a balance between
the needs of the victims of oil spills (compensation for the harm) and
the needs of the economic actors (continuation of activities), favors the
latter. 134 The victims of a recent oil spill, caused by the tanker Erika,
have for that reason sought to escape the limitations of the international
civil liability regime. They try to rely on the more protective provisions
of national criminal law or EU waste legislation, 135 instead. 136 All other
public law instruments, such as the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("HR
Convention"), also seem incapable of alleviating the victims' concerns.
For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of limitation provided for in
paragraph l of this Article the owner shall constitute a fund for the total sum
representing the limit of his liability with the Court or other competent authority of
any one of the Contracting States in which action is brought under Article IX or, if
no action is brought, with any Court or other competent authority in any one of the
Contracting States in which an action can be brought under Article IX. The fund can
be constituted either by depositing the sum or by producing a bank guarantee or
other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation of the Contracting State where the
fund is constituted, and considered to be adequate by the Court or other competent
authority.
Id. art. V.
134. Cf A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National
and International Law, 17 OXFORD J. ENVTL. L. 3 (2005); see EDWARD H. P. BRANS,
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE, AND
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (1st ed. 2001 ); LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
(Colin M. De la Rue ed., 1993); Gotthard M. Gauci, Protection of the Marine Environment
Through the International Ship-Source Oil Pollution Compensation Regimes, 8 REv. EUR.
COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 29 (1999); Magnus Goransson, Liability for Damage to the
Marine Environment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 345 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999);
David Wilkinson, Moving the Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage Caused
by Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of two New International Protocols, 5 OXFORD J. ENVTL. L.
71 (1993 ). For more critical approaches, see Anne Daniel, Civil Liability Regimes as a
Complement to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound International Policy or
False Comfort? , 12 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 225 (2003); Michael Faure & Wang
Hui, The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are they
Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 242 (2003); Armelle Gouritin, The
International Regime for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage. A Good Candidate to
Have a Human Rights Approach?, 20 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L.194 (2011);
Drame lbrahima, Recovering Damage to the Environment per se Following an Oil Spill:
The Shadows and Lights of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions of 1992, 14 REV. EUR.
COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 63 (2005).
135. See Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v. Total Fr. SA, 2008 E.C.R. 1-4501,
paras. 24-27, 66.
136. See Gouritin, supra note 134.
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The precision and delegation of the HR Convention is low and much
inferior to that of the CLC Convention.
The example demonstrates how a Public Legal Instrument can be
very hard in terms of its obligations, precision and delegation, and that
it may then tend to be working to shield rather than to govern the
specific powerful group of TNCs, in the quoted example the shipping
compames.

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Legal Instruments
The application of the softness tool on Public Legal Instruments
reveals that they tend to score low on the mandatory language, precision
and specificity in terms of managing TNCs and other private actors.
The level of obligation for states in fulfilling their tasks as delegatees
also remains ambiguous. Especially the extra-territorial enforcement of
home state laws against national corporations is rare. In many respects,
the "hard law" turns out not to be hard at all, even if there clearly is
potential for it be so.

I
I

I Instrumentum
Formal source of IL or not

Obligation
Authority, mandatory
language

Precision
Accuracy,
specificity

Delegation
Extent,
authority

"Softness in
average"

Soft

Hard

Figure 4: "Softness" of TNC Related Public Legal Instruments in
Human Rights and Environmental Protection.
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B. Public Non-Legal Instruments
1. General Observations
The second group, Public Non-Legal Instruments contains
agreements between state parties, state-centric institutions or even
looser gatherings of public officials. The proliferation of international
organizations has increased the importance of public yet non-legal
instruments, 137 and this is also true for the governance of TNCs. Such
instruments are therefore not a new phenomenon in international
governance, and their longstanding role has been described by scholars,
such as Schachter, Lipson, and Aust. 138
The obvious observation on the softness of the entire category of
Public Non-Legal Instruments is what distinguishes them from formal
law: that governments and international organizations ("IOs") have
opted for a non-legal instrumentum, that is not formal law. The nonlegal nature of the instrumentum is often reflected in the denominations
of the instruments, such as "recommendations" or "guidelines."
Sometimes a closer analysis of the IO's constitutive instrument, or of
the content of the agreement, is necessary to establish that one is indeed
dealing with a non-legal instrumentum.
Many Public Non-Legal Instruments that relate to TNC behaviour
are adopted through, or by, IOs such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation in Europe ("OECD"), the United Nations ("U.N.") and the
United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP"). Their authority
tends to vary on a case-by-case basis: the U.N. as an eminent
organization can assert great moral authority on state and TNC
activities, while the OECD is regarded highly by TNCs for its
competence and expertise on economic issues. The obligations created
by the authority of other IOs, for instance UNEP, towards TNCs are in

137. See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2005); see, e.g., Christian Brutsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Complex Legalization and
the Many Moves to Law, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 9, 9-27
(Christian Brutsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007) (discussing the increase in international
law making and legalization of transnational relations); Kai Raustiala, Institutional
Proliferation and the International Legal Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 293 (Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 20 I 2) (referring to institutional proliferation and the rise
of institutional density).
I 38. See Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International
Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787 (I 986); Charles Lipson, Why are Some
International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991); Oscar Schachter, The
Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
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many cases softer. What is relatively new in Public Non-Legal
Instruments is that increasingly they contain a mixture of provisions that
are intended to directly cover the behavior of non-state actors, even
though the non-state actors have no official part in the adoption of such
instruments. This increases the obligatory nature of the instruments
towards TNCs. On the other hand, the member states of international
organizations voting in favor of such instruments tend to equate them
with political agreements. The language of the instruments is not
mandatory, and hence does not create obligations: not on the TNCs, the
states, nor on the !Os adopting them. The member states tend to share
the idea that the TN Cs' behavior needs to change in certain ways, and
wish to point each other's actions into that direction. The instruments
that are directly addressed to TNCs only encourage them to act in a
certain way.
The sub-dimensions of precision-the accuracy and specificity of
the instruments
appear to vary widely in Public Non-Legal
Instruments. Specificity perhaps tends to be the 'harder' sub-dimension
of the two, as the instruments occasionally address specific kinds of
businesses and specific types of TNC behavior, but are less often very
accurate about what exactly the states and TNCs are in practice
expected to do.
Finally, the delegation dimension tends to be low across Public
Non-Legal Instruments, as the implementation and interpretation of the
instruments is mostly left to the enacting states and !Os themselves.
2. The OECD Guidelines and National Contact Points
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") adopted the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
("OECD Guidelines" or "Guidelines") in 1976, and revised them in
2000 and 2011.
The OECD Guidelines are "recommendations
addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or
from" OECD Member States adhering to the Guidelines. 139 They
"provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible business
conduct in a global context," 140 thus apparently aiming to fill the void
left by the Human Rights Covenants with their unclear stance on extraterritoriality. The Guidelines encourage companies to "[r]espect the

139. OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises,

0RG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION

3 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf (last
visited Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
140. Id.
AND DEV.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/5

50

Kalimo and Staal: "Softness" in International Instruments: The Case of Transnationa

2015]

Softness and Transnational Corporations

413

internationally recognised human rights of those affected by their
activities," 141 "wherever they operate." 142
In terms of precision, the OECD Guidelines are thus specifically
addressed at multinational enterprises and are quite accurate as to what
is expected from them. For example, the Guidelines state that
[a] State's failure either to enforce relevant domestic laws, or to
implement international human rights obligations or the fact that it may
act contrary to such laws or international obligations does not diminish
the expectation that enterprises respect human rights. 143

However, much of the language is not phrased as obligations. In
most provisions, "should," "seek ways to," or "does not diminish the
expectation" in the provisions just quoted above prevail over "shall." 144
It remains unclear where in the Guidelines an obligation for the TNCs 145
to actually act in accordance with them is really created. Perhaps it
flows from the "procedural" obligations that are phrased in more
mandatory terms. 146 For instance, TNCs-if acting in accordance with
the Guidelines-must have an internal policy on human rights, carry out
human rights due diligence and "provide for or co-operate through
legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights
impacts." 147 Yet the Guidelines do not mention any sanctions on
transnational corporations that do not carry out such tasks. It should be
recalled that for the TNCs, the Guidelines indeed only establish nonbinding principles. The ability of the procedural provisions of the
Guidelines to set obligations that amount to a high level of hardness in
the sense of the tool will hence depend on the authority of the
instrument, and the OECD more generally. As was noted above, the
corporate community would seem to regard the organization rather
highly. 148
A further dimension along which to measure the hardness of the
Guidelines is the delegation of their implementation and enforcement.
141. Id. at 19, art. 11.A.2.
142. Id. at 17, art. 1.3.
143. Id. at 32, art. IV.38.
144. See e.g., OECD Guidelines supra note 139, art. IV.1-IV.3.
145. Id. at 21, para. 3 (The OECD Guidelines uses the terminology "MN Es.").
146. Id. at 31, art. IV.4-IV.6.
147. Id. at31,art. IV.6.
148. For an example of a critical approach to the OECD Guidelines, see Joris
Oldenziel & Joseph Wilde-Ramsing, OECD Guidelines Lack Teeth, Influence, OECD
WATCH (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://oecdwatch.org/news-en/oecd-guidelines-lackteeth-influence (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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The Guidelines do set legally binding obligations on the OECD member
states in this respect. The states must, amongst other things, establish
"National Contact Points" ("NCPs") to assist companies and their
stakeholders in complying with the Guidelines. 149 This obligation finds
a legal backrest in Article 5(a) of the OECD Convention, which
specifically mandates state parties to follow the OECD Guidelines'
procedural and institutional rules regarding the setting up of NCPs and
the proceedings that they are to follow. 150 However, it is doubtful
whether the NCPs may be considered independent from the executive
branch of the states that establish them. As noted, this triggers
problems on the role of the state as a delegatee. 151 This problem is
slightly less serious in OECD Guidelines than in many Public Legal
Instruments because the state is implementing standards that apply
directly to the TNCs instead of relying on their indirect application
through the duty to protect. It has been argued that the NGOs also play
the role of a delegatee, next to the NCPs themselves, because the
procedure allows NGOs to bring cases to the attention of the NCPs. 152
In practice, this is the way in which a case usually reaches an N CP.
A more serious problem is the limited extent of delegation. The
ultimate power of the NCPs resides in their ability to make public
statements. While the power of negative publicity in inducing changes
in TNC behavior (or at least in the image it wishes to promote) should
not be underestimated, it usually still falls short of the obligatory force
of, for instance, monetary fines or the judicial prosecution of
individuals. There are good reasons to doubt the extent to which the
NCPs are, or can be expected to be, performing their tasks as effective

149. OECD Guidelines, supra note 139, at 68.
150. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
art. 5(a), OECD, Dec. 14, 1960, available at http://www.oecd.org/general/
conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-operationanddevelopment.htm (last visited Apr.
1, 2015) [hereinafter OECD].
151. The Netherlands tried to mitigate this problem by making its NCP a more
independent body, but the OECD Guidelines require at least some measure of government
involvement, so that independence could only partially be achieved. For instance, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs can still make a statement before a report is made public. See
Dutch National Contact Point: Aspirations and Expectations Met? Report of the NCP Peer
(2010),
available
at
http://www.jura.uniReview
Team
bonn.de/fileadmin/Fachbereich_Rechtswissenschaft/Einrichtungen/Lehrstuehle/Verwaltung
srecht/de_Wet/27_Dutch_NCP.Peer_Review.pdf(last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
152. OECD, supra note 150, at 1774. According to Schuler, another possible role of
delegatee is reserved for the OECD Investment Committee, but its role is limited to posting
clarifications of a general nature and it cannot overrule statements by NCPs in specific
cases.
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implementers and interpreters of the Guidelines. In fact, there is no sign
that TNCs actually have been publically reproached in more cases than
the odd one out. For example, in the eleven cases over a period of ten
years-a low figure in itself-on which the NCP of the Netherlands so
far has reached a Final Report, not once did it find a reason to publicize
the violations of substantive rights. 153 In but a few cases did it find that
transparency, communication and other such more secondary issues
were below the OECD standard. 154 It urged the companies in question
to improve those particular points, or only congratulated them for
having already done so. In the remainder of the cases, the NCP
concluded that no 'investment context' or 'nexus' existed, so that the
situation fell outside the scope of the OECD Guidelines, 155 or that
bilateral talks between the NGO complainant and the company had
already brought the issue to a close. 156 The figures on the Dutch N CP
reflect those on other OECD member states. 157

153.
Closed
Procedures,
MINISTRY
FOREIGN
AFF.,
available
at
http://www.oecdguidelines.nl/notifications/contents/overview-notifications/closedprocedures (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
154. See e.g., Neth. Nat'] Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the
"Complaint (dated May 15, 2006) on the Violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (PSPC), Pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises",
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 14 (July 14, 2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/43663730.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
155. See Neth. Nat'] Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the Specific
Instance Raised by Shehri-CBE Concerning Makro-Habib Pakistan Limited, Raised on 9
October 2008, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (Feb. 2010), available
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/46085466.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
156. See Neth. Nat'] Contact Point, Final Report of the National Contact Point for the
OECD Guidelines in the Netherlands on the Specific Instance Notified by CEDHA,
INCASUR Foundation, SOMO and Oxfam Novib Concerning Nidera Holding B. V., OECD
GUIDEUNES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (Feb. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/Netherlands_final_statement_nidera_ 03-02-2012.pdf (last
visited Apr. I, 2015).
157. See JORIS OLDENZIEL, JOSEPH WILDE-RAMSING & PATRICIA FEENEY, OECD
WATCH 10 YEARS ON: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES TO RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 10-11 (2010).
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Figure 5: "Softness" of OECD Guidelines

3. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (" U.N. Guiding Principles" or "Principles'')
The U .N. Guiding Principles are the result of a U .N. Human Rights
Council mandate to the Special Representative of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, John Ruggie. On the basis of the mandate, Ruggie was to
develop such principles within the framework proposed in his Report to
"Protect, Respect and Remedy." 158 The Principles rest accordingly on
the Report's three pillars of protection, respect and remedy:
The first is the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by
third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate
policies, regulation, and adjudication. The second is the corporate

158. Ruggie, supra note 9, para. 9.
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responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business
enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the
rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are
involved. The third is the need for greater access by victims to
effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. 159

The text of the U .N. Guiding Principles was consulted extensively
with a wide variety of relevant actors ranging from governments to
businesses and NGOs. 160 The substantive principles of the U.N.
Guiding Principles are quite similar to the OECD Guidelines, which in
their 2011 version were aligned with the former. 161 Yet, the U.N.
Guiding Principles have a broader scope ratione personae, because they
include TN Cs from all U .N. member states, rather than from the
industrialized OECD countries only. Ratione materiae, the U.N.
Guiding Principles are not limited to investment settings, unlike the
OECD Guidelines. In other words, the U.N. Principles apply to a larger
number of states and TN Cs, and to a wider array of situations.
The U .N. Guiding Principles were adopted by the geographically
representative U .N. Human Rights Council. The Principles' hardness
along the obligation dimension of the tool is likely to benefit from the
rather strong systemic coherence with the human rights Covenants. As
explained previously, systemic coherence denotes the influence that one
instrument may have on the performance of another along the
dimensions of the tool. The interaction between a similarly aligned
Public Legal Instrument, such as a human rights Covenant, and a Public
Non-Legal Instrument, such as the U.N. Guiding Principles, could
mutually increase the hardness of both instruments. In this case both
instruments are even a part of the U .N. human rights system. The
Principles could lead judiciaries to interpret more specifically the
obligations of states as delegatees vis-a-vis TNC conduct under the
Covenants. 162 Since all parties to the human rights Covenants are also
parties to the U.N., the U.N. Guiding Principles could be argued to
constitute a subsequent agreement or practice that contributes to the

159. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, para. 6.
160. Id. para. 12.
161. This is understandable since the most recent version of the OECD Guidelines
(2011) explicitly states that they are in line with the UN Guiding Principles. OECD
Guidelines, supra note 139, at 3.
162. Arguably, there is no reason why this would not be true as well to some extent for
the OECD Guidelines, just as for all other Public Non-Legal Instruments, which may
influence the development of the law through interpretation or the development of
customary international law.
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interpretation of the pre-existing international human rights obligations
of states. 163 Alternatively, the U.N. Guiding Principles could be
considered a part of the opinio Juris in the formation of new customary
rules. 164 Most relevant in this respect is that Part I of the UN Guiding
Principles deals with what the state "duty to protect" amounts to for
companies. 165 The notion of systemic coherence thus provides insights
in how one instrument may have a high level of obligation but lack in
precision, while for another one the situation is the other way around.
Taken together, the instruments may alleviate each other's softness.
The obligations created by the U.N. Guiding Principles could
therefore be harder than the principled, non-legal nature of their form
would lead to assume, if they are "hardened" by their close links to
existing "hard law" instruments.
Conversely, the U.N. Guiding
Principles could oblige states, and consequently TNCs, by further
"hardening" the obligations that the states have earlier agreed to as
delegatees under human rights Covenants.
This line of reasoning nevertheless holds in practice only where the
Public Non-Legal Instrument in question is actually hard
comprehensively, i.e. is also precise and uses mandatory language. It is
questionable whether this is the case for the U .N. Guiding Principles.
First, the duties of states in the Principles are not phrased in a
mandatory or particularly accurate fashion. The duty of the states
towards "abuses by private actors" is in the Principles defined by using
wordings such as "appropriate steps," "discretion," and "should
consider." 166 Compared with how state duties have developed in the
jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies, the U .N.
Guiding Principles may therefore be a step backwards in terms of
accuracy. The vagueness about what the duty to protect amounts to
leaves the states a wider margin of discretion on what is acceptable
TNC behavior. 167 A closer analysis of the Principles thus reveals
evidence of systemic incoherence, or antagonism, in contrast to what
initially seemed like a case of coherence.

163. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, para. 14; see also Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 31(2)(b), May 23 , 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
164. This is what happened to some of the principles established in the famous Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).
165. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, at 3.
166. Id. at 3-4.
167. Nicola Jagers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making
Headway Towards Real Accountability?, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 161 (2011).
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Moreover, the express emphasis in the Principles that no
international obligations are set on the corporations directly, only on the
states, obviously dilutes the obligatory character of the Principles on
TNCs. In the period before the drafting of the Principles, the idea of
setting legal obligations for companies was still taken seriously. 168 The
"Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" 169 were
however dismissed, after which the appointment of the Special
Representative followed. The part that directly applies to companies
speaks only of responsibilities to respect, but not of obligations in the
same more explicit sense as the duties laid on states. The concept of
"responsibility" is not defined any further than that a certain standard of
conduct is "expected" of the businesses. 170 Moreover, the U.N. Guiding
Principles do not state on what basis this responsibility arises. Clearly,
it is not on the basis of a legal instrumentum. Since TNCs are not
legally bound by the Principles, the Principles represent to the TNCs, a
mere reiteration of pre-existing legal obligations, and a consensually
agreed moral obligation to reach beyond such legal obligations. The
hardness of such a moral obligation would depend on the authority of
the instrument. 171
In terms of precision, the U .N. Guiding Principles represent the
high end in this paper's examples of instruments. They are slightly less
specific than the OECD Guidelines, because the drafters broadened
their scope of application to all businesses rather than to TNCs alone.
Also accuracy is reasonably high, with elaborate commentaries to each
of the "Operational Principles." The part that sets out the desired scope
and content of the companies' human rights due diligence processes
seems to some extent comparable to an environmental impact

168. Id. at 160 ("From the very beginning professor Ruggie has steered determinedly
away from the concept of human rights obligations for corporations and instead placed
exclusive emphasis on the State as the sole duty-bearer."). See also De Feyter supra note
15, at 78.
169. Sub-Comm ' n on Promotion and Prot. Human Rights, Commentary on the Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enter. with Regard to
Human Rights, Rep. on its 55th Sess., Aug. 26, 2003 , U.N. Doc.
E/CN .4/Sub.2/2003/ 12/Rev .2 (2003 ).
170. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, at 13.
171. Special Representative Ruggie notes quite positively the numerous consultations
he had with companies in establishing the Principles. See Ruggie, supra note 9,
Introduction, 7, 12. It is difficult to assess whether the consultations have truly supported
the authority of the Principles, or were merely something that TNCs participated in to
maintain a constructive image and to influence any obligations they could be subjected to.
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assessment. 172 The focus of the Principles is on prevention, which the
TNCs have direct influence on, and which is often more effective than
remediation.
However, although precise, much is laid out in descriptive and
explanatory concepts that do not amount to new mandatory
requirements from the perspective of the dimension of obligation. So
while accurate, the Principles and their Commentaries at most reiterate
existing legal requirements. They, for example, note that in many
jurisdictions, complicity in committing a crime can lead to criminal
liability, even on TNCs, but they do not in any way expand the scope of
such liability. 173
Even precise obligations on companies need to be interpreted when
they are implemented into practice. The implementation is optimally
delegated to separate authorities. Yet on delegation, the U.N. Guiding
Principles are considerably softer than, for example, the OECD
Guidelines.
An earlier version of the Principles envisaged an
Ombudsperson, 174 but this role was apparently removed. The Principles
in the part on the state Duty to Protect probably confused rather than
clarified the role of states as delegatees in the implementation and
enforcement of international human rights law on TNCs. 175 The part on
Access to Remedy calls for various kinds of national and companybased non-judicial grievance mechanisms to complement the statebased judiciaries. In other words, the Principles neither strengthen the
role of home states nor do they create a centralized authority to
coordinate the implementation. They only advocate a very soft form of
delegation that excludes the power to take decisions. Moreover, such
mechanisms are only encouraged, rather than made mandatory. The
contrast to the National Contact Points ("NCPs"), mandated by the
OECD Guidelines, is clear.

172.
173.
174.
175 .

Guiding Principles, supra note 48, at 17-23.
Id. at 18.
Ruggie, supra note 9, para. l 03.
Jagers, supra note 167.
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Figure 6: "Softness" of UN Guiding Principles

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Non-Legal Instruments
Public Non-Legal Instruments score around the average on several
dimensions of softness in the tool. While scoring rather high on the
dimension of precision, the Public Non-Legal Instruments in this paper
score low on the scale of delegation. They are low on the scale of
obligation as well, because the two sub-dimensions of obligationauthority and the mandatory nature of the language-give contradictory
results. The language used is often overtly non-mandatory, and this fact
cannot be fully compensated by the respectability of the !Os involved,
which is likely to reinforce the authority of the instruments. Public
Non-Legal Instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines and the UN
Guiding Principles, by definition lack the legally binding character of
their counterparts in formal treaties. Unless they are considered
interpretive agreements, they cannot be invoked before a judge as
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directly applicable to a dispute. Systemic coherence, therefore, could
influence the softness or hardness of a non-legal instrument. However,
unless that dynamic clearly increases the level of obligation and
delegation, the softness along these two dimensions only appears to
permit average levels of hardness in this category of instruments.

Instrumentum
Formal source of IL or not
Obligation
Authority,
mandatory language

Precision
Accuracy, specificity

Soft

Hard

Figure 7: Effects of Systemic Coherence - Hardening Public NonLegal Instruments Through Hard Law

C. Private Instruments
1. General Observations
There are a great number of instruments that belong to the third
group: private instruments with direct relevance to TNC behavior.
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Despite the variance among the instruments in this category, It Is
possible to make some general assumptions on how they score on the
dimensions of the tool.
Private instruments, as explained above in Section III, derive their
denomination from the fact that their dominant authors are neither states
nor state-centric international organizations.
These types of
organizations do not have the capacity to adopt instruments that qualify
as formal sources of international law, i.e. as Public Legal Instruments.
None of these instruments in other words has a legal instrumentum. At
the same time, however, such authors do have the capacity to agree
among themselves on instruments that are of private kind.
Private instruments vary significantly by the combinations of
authors adopting them. These authors are principally businesses or their
associations, as well as national and international NGOs. In many
fields, TNCs and NGOs have even entered into a veritable contest to set
the applicable standards. Sometimes a single instrument is ultimately
agreed upon by TNCs and NGOs together, such as the much discussed
Forest Stewardship Principles and Criteria. Some private instruments
are adopted together with or without the support of states or
international organizations that result in some cases in so-called publicprivate partnerships ("PPPs"). 176 It is for that reason not always easy to
distinguish between private and public instruments, although in most
cases either the public or the private actors will be in a dominant role.
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights ("VPSHR")
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ("EITI") are,
respectively, examples of a venture purely among TNCs and a venture
between TN Cs and a few states. In some cases, such as the UN Global
Compact, NGOs have heavily criticized PPPs for being dominated from
the outset by business interests under the umbrella of what was formally
a state or IO initiative. 177
It is difficult to make generalizations along the tool's dimension of
authority with so many different author-addressee combinations. Public
authors are generally, but not always, more authoritative than private
parties, and the views on the authority of self-regulation vary greatly.
Low authority indicates low obligation, and hence softness. Mandatory
176. Peter Utting & Ann Zammitt, United Nations-Business Partnerships: Good
Intentions and Contradictory Agendas, 90 J. Bus. ETHICS 39 (2009).
177. Paine, supra note 13, at 13-14. See also J. Martens, Precarious Partnerships: Six
Problems of the Global Compact Between Business and the UN, GLOBAL PoL'Y FORUM,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/225/32252.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2014).
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nature of the language differs widely as well: the Forest Stewardship
Council confronts a TNC with mandatory language, while the U .N.
Global Compact does not. It is voluntary to sign up for either
instrument.
Generally, the dimension of delegation is very soft across the
board, in particular where private instruments are a form of selfregulation. The role of the state as delegatee is absent in the context of
private instruments. In the NGO-led schemes, there may be some
delegation to the N GOs, and the TN C schemes sometimes rely on
external firms that perform corporate social accountability audits. Yet
neither of them wields the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the
state.
Specificity is often high, not only ratione personae, but also
ratione materiae, as companies are the only addressees. The language
used may range from the very accurate and mandatory expressions of
technical standards to the very open and loosely formulated texts that
are predominant in the human rights and environmental context, such as
the Corporate Social Responsibility declarations of TNCs. Finally, on
precision there is again much variance. The NGO principles usually
score higher on this dimension than their TNC counterparts.

2. The United Nations Global Compact ("U.N. Global Compact" or
"Global Compact'') 178
The United Nations Global Compact is a cooperative initiative of
the U .N. and businesses, based on the multi-stakeholder ideology of
U.N.-Business Partnerships that became prevalent in the U.N. in the
1990's. 179 The Global Compact is based on the voluntary incorporation
by TNCs of a set of ten principles on human and labor rights,
environmental rights, and the fight against corruption into all their
activities. The companies also undertake to actively defend these values
The Global Compact is
within their "sphere of influence." 180
completely voluntary, both in regards to the initial registration as well
as the subsequent adherence to the rules. In earlier versions, the
principles were quite vague, but recently they refer to the U .N. Guiding
Principles' chapter on the responsibilities of businesses. The link
178. The content of this section is derived partly from Tim Staal, The Roles of Hard
Law and Soft Law in the Regulation of Global Business Conduct (2010) (unpublished
Master's Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussels) (on file with authors).
179. Utting & Zammitt, supra note 176, at 39-40.
180. See Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, available at
http: //www.unglobalcompact.org/ AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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subjects companies to the more elaborate set of principles. They give
more accurate, yet clearly non-mandatory guidance about the steps that
TNCs can take not to violate existing legal rules. One may clearly
notice the effects of positive systemic coherence between the Global
Compact and the Principles. For example:
Principle 2: "Businesses should make sure they are not
complicit in human rights abuses;" 181
Principle 9: "Businesses should encourage the
development and diffusion of environmentally friendly
technologies." 182
The Global Compact awards companies who report their efforts on
a regular basis the right to sport the Global Compact Logo. A sanction
exists in the form of "de-listing" a company that does not report on its
efforts over three consecutive one-year periods. 183 But in order to
remain listed, a company need not do anything substantive. This TNCfavorable overall set-up attests to the private sector dominance in the
Global Compact, and speaks for analyzing this public-private
arrangement under the category of Private Instruments.
The Global Compact is based on the idea of forming a "community
among the participants in which each individual actor strives to appear
as appropriate in relation to other members of the network and to their
stakeholders at large, a stance that should drive them to act according to
the articulated principles." 184 Thus, the success of the Global Compact
seems to depend on the plausibility of this relation between (superficial)
peer accountability, the attractiveness of the Logo, and a TNC improved
human rights and environmental record. This outcome seems quite case
specific: what may create a hard instrument for a diligent TNC with
high brand recognition and many aggressive competitors, may appear
completely soft for a low profile free rider. The difficulty in even
measuring such attributes against the tool illustrates well in fact the
uncertainties and vagueness inherent in this type of an instrument.
181.
The
Ten
Principles,
U.N . GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015).
182. Id.
183. Integrity
Measures,
U.N.
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015).
184. See Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, Emergent Cross-Sectional Soft Regulations:
Dynamics at Play in the Global Compact Initiative, in SOFT LA w IN GOVERNANCE AND
REGULATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 129, 138-40 (Ulrika Morth ed., 2004).
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In terms of softness, the drafters of the Global Compact seem to
expect that the lack of mandatory and precise wording, as well as the
emphasis on the Global Compact' s voluntary nature, are compensated
through the hardness of other dimensions. The primary means here is
the delegation of the supervision over self-implementation to "other
members of the network and to their stakeholders at large." 185 These
groups include other TNCs and NGOs. This has, however, arguably
remained an empty promise. First of all, a single group of actors, the
TNCs themselves, "appear[s] as rule setters, rule enforcers, rule
followers and rule monitors." 186 This is at odds with the very idea of
delegation. Second, the delegation of authority to "stakeholders at
large" points to two groups of actors: the general public and NGOs.
The former may be expected to react at press stories about serious
violations, but will not actively compare company behavior to the
Principles. So in that sense the general public has a limited, if any task
at all, in the governance of the Global Compact. The most visible part
of the public, NGOs, have from the beginning played an ambivalent role
in the Global Compact. N GOs can be members, just like TN Cs, and
can therefore present a matter of alleged "egregious abuse" to the
Global Compact Board. However, the ultimate sanction is the "delisting" of the TNC. Such an outcome seems superficial at best, and
thus makes for a very unsatisfactory route for NGOs. Compared to the
OECD Guidelines' National Contact Points or to the human rights
treaty bodies, one may conclude that barely any delegation of authority
takes place under the Global Compact.

185. Id. at 140.
186. Id.
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Figure 8: "Softness" of the UN Global Compact, with the Impact of
Systemic Coherence Highlighted

3. The Forest Principles of the Forest Stewardship Council
Fores try is an area where nation states have consistently failed to
reach a global legally binding agreement. Negotiations on a global
forest convention were called off already at the Rio Earth Summit of
1992. 187 The International Tropical Timber Agreement ("ITT A") is
187. Benjamin Cashore et al., Can Non-state Governance 'Ratchet Up' Global
Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest Sector, 16 RECIEL 158, 158 (2007).
All substantive provisions of the ITTA 2006, which entered into force 7 December 2011, are
indeed formulated as 'objectives' (Article 1), that are to be implemented through "policy
work and project[ s]" (Article 24) and funding (Article 21) and the conduct of studies
(Article 27). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Negotiation of a
Successor Agreement to the International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 16-27, 2006,
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 27, 2006, U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER.3.12 (Feb.
I, 2006).
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criticized for focusing on trade issues and leaving environmental
protection practically entirely at domestic discretion. What is left are a
number of initiatives that in the course of the 1990's resulted in nonbinding instruments with weak substance. 188 Possibly for these very
reasons, forestry was one of the first fields where a new form of private
transnational regulation appeared: the NGO-based certification scheme
of the Forest Stewardship Council ("FSC") aims directly at changing
the behavior of large forestry companies, 189 often TN Cs.
The FSC stands both for a governance scheme, the Forest
Stewardship Council, and for a set of principles on forestry. 190 These
"Forest Principles and Criteria" are further "elaborated through more
specific global standards, which are adapted to local conditions by
national or regional chapters." 191 FSC-certified forests must have a
continuously updated management plan, the implementation of which is
to be monitored and periodically verified by an accredited third-party
auditor. 192 Participating companies may actually be obliged to change
their policies, even in ways that are not necessarily cost-effective. 193
The Forest Principles are specific in that they refer to one particular
sector with its own demands, and they are also quite accurate. There are
detailed provisions on tenure and use rights (Principle 2), indigenous
188. Intergovernmental Panel on Forests; Intergovernmental Forum on Forests; United
Nations Forum on Forests, which produced the "Plan of Action" and the "Programme of
Work," contained in E/CN.18/2001 /3/Rev.1, which Dimitrov describes as "masterpieces of
Machiavellian diplomacy." Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms : States, Institutions
and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 11 (Nov. 2005).
189. The high intensity of research on the FSC shows that if any private regulatory
instrument is taken seriously and seen as a forerunner, it is the FSC. Interestingly, this
literature has also ventured into the complement-substitute-or-antagonist debate referred to
above. See generally Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public
Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 75-76 (2006); Cashore et al., supra
note 187, at 160; Jonathan Zeitlin, Pragmatic Transnationalism : Governance Across
Borders in the Global Economy, 9 Socio-ECON. REV. 187, 196-97 (2011); Tim Bartley,
Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The Limits of Forest and Labor Standards
Certification in Indonesia, 12 Bus. & POL. 1, 7-8 (2010); Tim Bartley, Transnational
Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and Private Standards, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 517, 517 (2011) [hereinafter Transnational Governance].
190. FSC Principles and Criteria/or Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-00! (version 40) , FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, available at http://ic.fsc.org/principles-andcriteria.34.htm (follow "FSC-STD-01-001" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
191. Christine Overdevest & Jonathan Zeitlin, Assembling an Experimentalist Regime:
Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector Revisited, in LEVELING THE
PLAYlNG FIELD: TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPM ENT 235, 247
(Laszlo Bruszt & Gerald A. McDermott eds., 2014).
192. Id.
193. Cashore et al. , supra note 187, at 161.
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peoples' rights (Principle 3), community relations (Principles 4) and
environmental impacts (Principle 6). 194 Moreover, all the mentioned
principles are phrased in clearly mandatory terms with every provision
using the verb "shall."
On the macro level, the hardness of the obligation will depend on
how many producers have been willing to join the scheme.
Participation is in principle voluntary, but the pressure to join is
nowadays rather high due to the strong developed country industry buyin and increasing consumer awareness. By the end of 2012, it was
estimated that 169. 324 million hectares, 195 compared to over 4 billion
hectares in total forest coverage, 196 were FSC-certified. Overall, the
high degree of authority of the scheme and its mandatory language
render the scheme quite hard in terms of the created obligation.
Delegation seems at first sight to be quite far reaching as well,
although ultimately it is the softest link in the FSC. The governance of
the FSC is in the hands of the tripartite Board of Directors, with
members representing Environmental, Social and Economic (i.e.
business) constituencies, and an equal participation from the global
North and South. 197 This multi-stakeholder set-up has arguably boosted
the authority of implementing the FSC. The interpretation of the Forest
Principles, discussed above, is in the hands of the FSC's organs, not in
that of the timber-producing participants. The Board of Directors has
indeed from time-to-time issued interpretive decisions on TNC
activities. 198 Moreover, fulfillment by a timber producer of the FSC
Principles is validated by independent certification bodies, which have
in turn been accredited by the FSC. 199
However, there are at least two reasons why the FSC and the
certification bodies as delegatees do not reach a high level of
delegation. First, it is quite impossible for the certification bodies to
regularly check the companies' adherence with the principles. Its

194. Id.
195. Facts & Figures, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014), available at https://ic.fsc.org/factsfigures-2012.509 .htm (last visited Apr. I, 2015).
196. State of the World's Forests 2012, FOOD & AGRIC. 0RG. U.N 15, FAO (2012),
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3010e/i3010e.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
In other words, about 4.2 % of total global forest coverage is certified by FSC.
197. Governance,
FSC
INTERNATIONAL
(2014 ),
available
at
http://ic.fsc.org/govemance.14.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
198. See id.
199. Accreditation,
FSC
INTERNATIONAL
(2014),
available
at
http://ic.fsc.org/accreditation.28.htm (last visited Apr. l, 2015).
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executive capacities fall far short of those of public authorities, even in
developing countries. Its knowledge of "local dynamics" is often
inadequate to really assess compliance with the FSC Principles'
criteria. 200 Second, and also connected to the lack of government
resources and the authority involved, the only sanction available is the
suspension of a forest's certification. As in most timber exporting
developing states, FSC certified forests still amount to only a fraction of
total production; this can hardly be called an effective sanction. To
summarize, a private, non-local authority without effective means of
enforcement makes for a "softer" delegatee than a public, local
authority.
The weaknesses in delegation are further aggravated by the FSC's
lack of legal instrumentum. FSC is a telling example of how the
softness of the dimensions of precision and obligation is quite limited,
yet the scheme still will have to yield in case of conflict with other,
formal rules such as domestic laws on forestry. As Bartley has
insightfully hypothesized and empirically researched with Indonesia as
case study, the design of private instruments such as the FSC and its
criteria disregard the domestic regulatory setting in which the rules are
expected to operate. For example, FSC Principle 2 requires that the
exploitation of certified local forests respects "the tenure and use rights
to the land and forest resources", and that such rights may only be given
up through the "free and informed consent" of the involved
communities. 201
However, in the large forestry industry country
Indonesia, the FSC requirements conflict with the domestic Forestry
Act. The Act has "affirmed state control over forest land", and although
the Forestry Act does protect local rights, "roughly ninety percent of the
twelve million hectares of state forest land in Indonesia has not been
properly defined. " 202 The FSC certifications have added another layer
of rules, with requirements that are in part contradictory to domestic
laws. Yet in case of conflict, the local formal law obviously prevails, as
is even explicitly stated in FSC Principle 1.1. 203 This problem may lead
200. Transnational Governance, supra note 189, at 533 (in the context of the
community land use rights demanded by Principle 2.2) ("One former auditor suggested that
assessment teams generally do not spend enough time on the ground to understand
community dynamics, explaining that you are 'lucky if there's an NGO there,' or it can be
difficult to learn the real situation.").
201.
The JO Principles, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, available at
https://ic.fsc.org/the-10-principles. l 03 .htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
202. Transnational Governance, supra note 189, at 531-32.
203. Revised FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-001
(V5-0), FSC INTERNATIONAL 12 (Rev. 2012), available at https://ic.fsc .org/principles-and-
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the FSC to "crumble under its own contradictions": a company must, to
be in conformity with the Forest Principles, both act in accordance with
local law, as well as in contravention of it. 204 Had the FSC's Principles
been laid down by states in a formal source of international law, it
would have been much less clear that domestic forestry law would have
prevailed in case of a conflict. The example shows well how the
instrumentum dimension is fundamentally important.

I nstrumentum
Formal source of IL or not
Obligation
Authority, mandatory
language
-·······

Precision

Accuracy, specificity

Delegation
Extent. authority
-

"Softness in
average"
...

··--

Soft

-

Hard

Figure 9: "Softness" of FSC

criteria.34.htm [hereinafter Revised FSC Principles and Criteria] (last visited Apr. I, 2015)
("Principle I: Compliance with Laws: The Organization shall comply with all applicable
laws, regulations and nationally-ratified international treaties, conventions and
agreements.").
204. Transnational Governance, supra note 189, at 534. Compare the above stated
umbrella to Principle I with Principle 1.8: "The Organization shall demonstrate a long-term
commitment to adhere to the FSC Principles and Criteria in the Management Unit, and to
related FSC Policies and Standards. A statement of this commitment shall be contained in a
publicly available document made freely available." Revised FSC Principles and Criteria,
supra note 203, at I 0.
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4. Concluding Perspectives on Private Instruments
There are many labeling initiatives, such as the FSC,205 and many
voluntary standards with an approach similar to the U.N . Global
Compact. Some of them are even aimed at more specific sectors,
problems or groups of TNCs, such as the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights ("VPSHR") and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative ("EITI").
Two main problems became apparent from the analysis of these
much-discussed private instruments. First, the great weakness in terms
of delegation is, in the words of Sahlin-Andersson, that "it is not so
clear who is governing whom." 206 Are NGOs governing TNCs? Or are
TNCs governing themselves-or even each other? What role remains
for governments? Second, it is unclear where obligation in these
instruments really comes from. They often refer to "international
human rights standards," and stress that lower local standards, local
government abuses, or lack of government enforcement do not impede
what companies "should" do. Yet it is not clear what exactly leads to
raise the requirements above the level of a mere moral obligation,
beyond a bare exclusion from a voluntary scheme. Is the marketplace
already sophisticated enough to create such an impact?
It was apparent that even an instrument that on the surface seems
to have a relatively high level of delegation, the FSC, in practice has
rather limited implementation resources. It moreover has to recede
where it conflicts with formal legal instruments that often maintain
lower environmental or human rights standard.
Although the
implementing authority is clearly delegated, its reach remains limited.

V. CONCLUSIONS-THE MYRIAD EFFECTS OF SOFTNESS
The tool developed in this paper has two aims. First, it aims to
contribute to the "soft law discourse" by promoting a move beyond the
inaccurate and overly generic term "soft law. " 207 This term appears
problematic in the global governance of TNCs. It is proposed here, on

205. Many of these are assembled under the ISEAL Alliance. See generally About Us,
ISEAL ALLIANCE, available at http://www.isealalliance.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 7,
2015).
206. Sahlin-Andersson, supra note 184, at 130.
207. See generally Abbott et al., supra note 73. With international law, they mean to
include explicitly formal sources of international law such as conventions/treaties. Id. at
402.
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the one hand, because it is more accurate and useful in the legal and
political discourse to describe instruments on the basis of the three
general categories introduced in the previous Section: Public Legal
Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments, and Private Jnstruments. 208
The categories build on the work of scholars such as d' Aspremont209
and Blutman. 210 The basic distinction lies in the dimension of
instrumentum, the "container" of the instrument, as opposed to its
negotium, the "contents."
On the other hand, it would add further, important nuance to the
understanding of the instruments to perceive them along four
dimensions of softness: the softness of the instrumentum, and of three
aspects of the negotium, namely obligation (authority and the
mandatory nature of the language); precision (accuracy and specificity);
and delegation (extent and authority of delegation). These dimensions
of softness, proposed originally by Abbott et al. 211 and developed
further here, fine-tune the analysis by bringing forth key characteristics
of the instruments.
Second, through the tool the paper explores how such resystemization of instruments functions in the specific framework of the
TN Cs, taking into account the challenge of finding solutions to the void
in their governance. The paper focuses in particular on how softness as
a characteristic manifests itself in different types of TNC related
instruments, and how this may link to the perceived void, and further to
the instruments' effectiveness. It may even be possible to contemplate
certain dimensions of softness, and combinations of thereof that are
necessary in reaching effectiveness in different circumstances. Finally,
the utility and potential weaknesses of the conceptual tool itself may be
elaborated upon during its application to practical case examples on the
global governance of TN Cs.

A. Effective Softness?
The application of the tool to various TNC related instruments,
including legal public instruments, illustrate well how an analysis of
softness is by no means limited to what is incorrectly called "soft law"
208. Compare these three groups with those distinguished by Blutman, who noted
output of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is
part of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society, which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 68, at 607-08.
209. See d'Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1082-87.
210. Blutman, supra note 68, at 607-08.
211. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401 .
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instruments. All kinds of hard and soft instruments can, and indeed
should, be scrutinized for their softness.
From the practical perspective of applying the instruments, the
essential question is whether, and to what extent, the observed softness
of an instrument correlates with its effectiveness. While the research in
this paper is not geared to answer this question with any definitiveness,
it is designed to prop exploratory insights onto what such a relationships
might be. The first observation along this trajectory is the usual claim
that "soft law" might be able to act as a supplement or a complement, or
even an alternative, to "hard law." 212 The claim assumes that somehow
an instrument that is soft along one or more of the depicted dimensions
can be effective in reaching a policy outcome. It can even potentially be
more effective in doing so than a "hard law" instrument would be.
The effectiveness in other words may link to softness-but how
exactly? At least two options appear to arise. In the first option, the
softness of one (or more) dimension( s) directly contributes to the fact
that the policy outcome is reached. This would reflect the scenario of
"soft law" acting as an alternative to "hard law": it is because of its
hardness along all the dimensions that a "hard law" instrument would
not able to reach the desired outcome. Softness would under this
assumption correlate positively with effectiveness.
The second option is that softness along one (or more) of the
dimension(s) is unavoidable for an instrument to be legally, politically,
technically, and/or in some other manner possible. Softness is the
critical prerequisite for a policy instrument to be created, yet it is the
other, hard dimension(s) of the instrument that in fact directly
determines the instrument's effectiveness. Soft instruments are in this
scenario a complement to "hard law." Softness as a characteristic only
has an indirect role. Without the subtlety the instrument would not
exist, and hence its qualities could not have an impact. The unique
quality of "soft" instruments as complements is their achievability. 213
They are, as explained in Section II, a necessity if "hard law" options
are not at all, or not initially, available. But softness in itself will rather
work against, than for, the effectiveness of the instrument. Softness is
in these instruments just limited enough not to impede reaching the
policy objective in a sufficient manner. The perceptions on what is
considered sufficient may be quite subjective and, as the examples of
212. "Soft law" may also be seen in some cases as an antagonist to "hard law," but
these questions are beyond the focus of this piece.
213. See Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401-03.
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using soft instruments to govern TNCs implied, not always
representative of the reality.
The first option, i.e. the direct role and relevance of softness in an
instrument's performance, can be tested through a number of
propositions. The most different case approach would lead one to ask
whether there are instruments that are soft on all the dimensions, yet
still perform effectively. A positive answer would point towards
effective instruments that are already quite removed from classic
command-and-control law. Although the limited scope of the research
does not exclude the possibility, the TNC case studies conducted in this
paper did not offer support for this hypothesis. Rather, the observations
on the case studies seemed to point to the opposite direction: when
defined along the dimensions used in this paper, there seems to be a
negative correlation between softness and effectiveness. A negative
correlation would hence perceive soft instruments in a paradoxical way:
one should seek for the vital aspects of hardness in defining effective
soft instruments. If the hypothesis on a positive correlation held, the
ensuing question would then be whether an instrument's effectiveness
could be associated with a particular aspect of softness.
B. Effective Hardness?
Indeed, looking back at the three categories of instruments and the
empirical examples within them, the observations would appear to point
into the opposite direction: some measure of hardness may be required
on at least one, if not most, of the dimensions also for instruments to be
effective. Turning this around, even the absence of hardness on one or
two dimensions beyond the instrumentum-for instance lack of
precision and specificity in the human rights treaties, or the incomplete
delegation in the case of the FSC-may be fatal for its effectiveness.
The conclusion of the case studies was that none of the instruments in
any of the categories of Public Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal
Instruments , and Private Instruments seemed to satisfactorily achieve
the set human rights and environmental governance objectives
regarding TNCs. The disappointing observation could hence have an
explanation: each one of the TNC related instruments-even the "hard
law" instruments- lacked one or more crucial hard dimensions that
would have allowed them to be effective in that particular instance.
1. Over-reaching
One may wonder, however, if the need to consider hard
dimensions in soft instruments is already a sign of "over-reaching":
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have the soft instruments been set to achieve objectives that only
instruments that are hard on all dimensions can achieve? Are they
surpassing the limits of what soft instruments in directly filling a policy
void can reach, even theoretically? In cases of over-reaching, soft
instruments cannot act as complements nor as alternatives to "hard
law"-except perhaps in some narrow respects.
As may be remembered from the development of the tool, the
instrumentum is a core dimension of classic "hard law" instruments.
Soft instruments lack this key characteristic; only in the first group,
which consists of the formal sources of international law, are the
instruments formally speaking law. Private instruments as defined in
this paper are adopted by private actors, either amongst themselves or in
collaboration with public authorities. Because private actors completely
lack the capacity to legislate, they cannot create formal instruments of
international law. The instrumentum is not legal. A logical reaction
would be to seek to increase hardness on the other dimensions of
obligation, precision and delegation-potentially even all of them. The
OECD Guidelines from the group of Public Non-Legal Instruments and
Forest Stewardship Council from the group of Private Instruments
served as examples. As noted above, while perhaps practically possible,
such across-the-board hardness would mean that the instrument
measures hard in average, so much so as start to conceptually changing
its nature from soft to hard, and even from non-law to law, if hardened
along the instrumentum to a legislative act. In other words, the soft
instrument has been "over-reaching," if the aim had been in policy
objectives that can in fact only be reached with formal legal instruments
that are hard on all accounts. It does not seem justified, or even
possible, to contemplate Public Non-Legal Instruments or Private
Instruments as effective alternatives or complements to "hard law" in
these types of situations. Their role would remain partial, at best.
2. Under-reaching
The fact that an instrument's effectiveness is tied to more hardness
on a particular dimension does not have to imply that all effective
instruments be considered "hard law." In practice, the relevance of such
labels of hardness or softness is linked to the ability of the tool to help
in creating the impetus to amend (i.e. to harden) an existing instrument
in a tailored and adequate manner so as to reach the set objective. The
situation may be different to the above examples of over-reaching. In
cases of "under-reaching," the soft instrument is not fulfilling its
complete promise, which would still be within the boundaries of what
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under the three categories and the four dimensions still constitute soft
instruments. Hardening a particular aspect of an under-reaching
instrument not would not always require pushing it beyond the
boundaries of what conceptually are soft instruments. Understanding
that the level of obligation and precision in the OECD Guidelines is
sufficient, but that it is mainly the delegation aspect of the instrument
that is lacking, could lead to amend the instrument in the correct
fashion. This would point towards amending the practice of N CPs to
become considerably more aggressive in publically reproaching the
companies for their violations of human rights law.
Under-reaching

Over-reaching

lnstrumentum
Formal source of IL or not
Obligation
Autho rity,
mandatory language

Instrumentum
Formal source of IL or not

OECD Guidelines

Ins/rumentum
Formal source of IL or not
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Authority,
mandatory language
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Accuracy.
speci fic ity

Delegation

Delegation

Ex tent. autho rity

Extent, authority

Softness

in average

Softness

in average

Soft

Hard

Hardness required for
effectively filling a void

Figure 10: Instrument's Achieved v. Potential Hardness in Cases of
Under-Reaching and Over-Reaching Instruments
Indeed, delegation appears to be a dimension on which practically
all of the TNC-instruments that were used as case examples measured
on the soft end of the scale. This implies an almost structural deficiency
in delegating the implementation of the instruments. The observation
finds clear parallels in the discourse on the deficiencies of "hard law":
poor implementation and enforcement is also often cited as the weak
point of hard international environmental and human rights law. In this
important respect "soft law" therefore appears to offer very limited
remedies. To state this differently: non-legal instruments could most
fundamentally remedy the deficiencies of "hard law" if their unique
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characteristics could innovatively improve enforcement. To reiterate
the above example: the impact of negative media coverage on TNCs
image can be drastic, and hence prompt sweeping changes in company
behavior. For example, heavy media attention led the company
Chiquita (formerly United Fruit) to completely overhaul in the early
1990s its dreadful corporate social responsibility policies on exotic fruit
business. Chiquita outsourced the corporate environmental and social
audits to an external NGO, the Rainforest Alliance. 214 Yet, to actually
create such an impact, the application of this instrument needs to be
delegated to a party that is prepared and equipped to publicize it without
hesitation and delay -not just in theory, but in practice. This is a far
cry from the current state of affairs, should the application of the media
provisions of the OECD Guidelines offer a representative example in
this respect.
It appears possible to give examples of under-reaching "soft law"
also in terms of all other dimensions of softness. The U .N. Guiding
Principles were an example of an instrument where the wording on what
is really expected is both ambiguous and drafted in non-mandatory
terms. More precise use of words that are clearly obligating would
harden this instrument in a way that would appear to be vital for
increasing its effectiveness in filling the policy void. Precision is a
dimension on which the non-legal instruments may score quite well,
because the tools can contain quite accurate provisions specifically
targeted at TNCs. It is in fact the legal instruments that may be underreaching on this aspect. The systemic coherence between soft and hard
instruments could in a useful way combine the precision of the soft
instruments with e.g. the hard instrumentum of for instance the Human
Rights treaties.

C. Softness -A Combination of Multiple Dimensions
Still, it is possible with the help of the developed conceptual tool to
synthesize the findings regarding the over-reaching and under-reaching
soft instruments a few steps further. The values of all the dimensions of
an instrument may be combined into a single value of "average
softness," as was explained in Section III (D) above.
The
softness/hardness of an instrument is only a single variable amongst
many other time- and space-specific, inter-related variables that affect

214. DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREWS. WINSTON , FROM GREEN TO GOLD. How SMART
COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE AND BUILD
COMPETITIVE ADV ANTAGE 88, 183-84 (2006).
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the overall policy outcomes in a globalized environment. 215 Yet a
summary value may be useful in having an overview on the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with, even if the line
between soft and hard is a subjective continuum, not a "metaphysical
border" where the overall characteristics of an instrument would
suddenly drastically change like the qualities of water change in the
melting and boiling points. This may be exactly the point of using the
model proposed here: the fact that any instrument consists of four
dimensions with their "sub-dimensions" should quickly lead to a
realization that the denomination of an instrument as "hard law" or "soft
law" actually reveals very little of its characteristics. It is the
constitutive dimensions of the instrument that matter. Jnstrumentum is
central, and admittedly the distinction of the formal sources of
international law implies a binary dimension.
But, its binary nature and importance are tempered by the other,
continuum-type dimensions. They too can be crucial, depending on
such factors as the instrument's objectives and addressees. The case
studies on Public Legal Instruments showed how "hard law" may be
quite soft. Case studies across the groups of instruments seemed to
suggest that weak delegation of implementing tasks in some cases
"softens" the instrument more than a low measure of precision or
obligation. The continuums are therefore useful; they make an analysis
of the instruments more flexible and accurate, and facilitate detailed
comparisons between them. As Abbot et al. noted216 while developing
these three dimensions, they can also serve to trace an instrument's
evolution over time. The dimensions were used here as a means to
understand, explain, and propose nuanced improvements to various
kinds of TNC related instruments.
One might also speculate whether there are specific combinations
of these dimensions of softness that are particularly well or poorly
adapted for certain kinds of policy objectives and/or circumstances.
Such "pairing" could support the policy making process. The case
studies gave anecdotal evidence of such interconnections. For example,
in the case of FSC, the hardness of the instrument along the dimensions
of precision and delegation considerably alleviated the need to have
fully hard obligations. Market pressures on TNCs also contributed to a
lesser emphasis on delegation in this particular example.

215. See generally Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67.
216. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 405.
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States and IOs often seem to enforce international law upon TNCs
in a rather lenient fashion: the delegation dimension was soft on
virtually all the analysed instruments. Only very limited delegation to
more independent, international bodies seems likely in the near future as
well.
Hardness along the other dimensions may alleviate that
shortcoming only in some cases, such as the example of FSCs above.
More precise and specific provisions will make it harder for states to
argue that they are not under an obligation to act in a given situation.

D. Systemic Coherence
Many authors have highlighted the importance of the systemic
coherence between different instruments.
Soft instruments may,
according to these views, act either as complements, alternatives or
antagonists to "hard law." This paper does not have as its objective to
delve into the systemic coherence of instruments. It does shed some
light on some of the interrelationships that were noticeable between the
U.N. Global Compact, U.N. Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines,
the Forest Stewardship Council, the human rights Covenants and
domestic law.
In particular, the systemic inconsistencies and
antagonistic relations deserve further research particularly in order to
better understand the prospects of governing TNCs. The discussion
merges here with themes such as the fragmentation and integration of
international law 217 and the management of institutional complexity in
global governance. 218
E. Prospects of Governing TNCs with "Soft Law"
1. "Soft law" as a Misnomer - But "Softness" as an Asset
The analysis above has elaborated on whether "soft law" may help
in filling the policy void left by "hard law" in governing transnational
corporations in the areas of environmental protection and human rights.
Softness may indeed be a quality that explains the characteristics of
policy instruments in a manner that is useful. However, this benefit has
often gone undetected
or has
been
overshadowed by

217. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 60, at 553; see also Study Group of the
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006).
218. For institutional interaction, see generally Thomas Gehring & Sebastian
Oberthilr, The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions, 15
EUR. J. INT'L R EL. 125 (2009).
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misunderstandings. 219 The softness of an instrument tends to correlate
negatively with its effectiveness- if any straightforward relationship
between the two is even verifiable. Softness as an overarching
conceptual construct might end up not only correlating with
ineffectiveness, but being defined by it. The notion of soft instruments,
let alone "soft law," as an optimal gap filler for legal voids appears in
this sense fundamentally flawed. Soft instruments may remedy policy
problems, but in most cases exactly despite of their softness.
Gearing the policy strategy towards "soft law" without properly
defining it could essentially threaten to misguide the entire effort.
Perhaps the clearest example is the U .N. Global Compact, which relies
on softness quite explicitly. 220 "Soft law" is therefore not only a vague
and overly generic concept-it may be a precarious misnomer. The
case studies on the governance of TN Cs gave insights into how "soft
law" approaches may create false assumptions, and might lead to
skewed policy pathways and meager outcomes. 221
The
conceptualization of the instruments and of the issue at stake, as well as
the definition of the desired policy objectives, need to take place m
much more accurate and authentic terms.

2. Soft Instruments as Complements and Alternatives to "Hard Law"
While "soft law" may be a misnomer, softness as a characteristic
that is first properly defined may prove to be quite useful. It helps in
explaining the characteristics of individual instruments. The notion of
softness may also be useful in more correctly understanding the general
characteristics that are commonly associated with soft instruments as we
noted them in Section II: their necessity, uniqueness and
unavoidability; 222 and their role as complements or alternatives 223 to
219. See d' Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1083.
Note d'Aspremont's recent
introduction in the Leiden Journal of International Law where he apologizes for devoting a
whole issue of the journal to such an oft-debated theme. See Jean d' Aspremont & Tanja
Aalberts, Which Future for the Scholarly Concept of Safi International Law? Editors'
Introductory Remarks, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (2012).
220. Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT (Apr. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2015) ("The initiative seeks to combine the best properties of the UN, such as moral
authority and convening power, with the private sector's solution-finding strengths and the
expertise and capacities of a range of key stakeholders. The Global Compact is global and
local; private and public; voluntary yet accountable.").
221. See Utting & Zammitt, supra note 176, at 44, 47 (showing the wide belief within
the UN in the late l 990's that soft approaches are preferable, because of lack of UN
implementation powers).
222. See supra Section II.
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"hard law." The uniqueness of soft instruments can mean a number of
things. It can refer either to the instrument as a whole or to some of its
particular characteristics. This observation prompts us to rethink the
categories of Shaffer and Pollack, soft instruments as complements or
alternatives to "hard law." A unique instrument would seem to mean
that it combines softness and hardness in a different way along the
dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation.
Unique soft
instruments are soft enough to be achievable-unlike a fully hard and
legal instrument-yet hard enough to be effective. Thus, they are able
to complement "hard law" in the narrow sense of addressing policy
questions that "hard law" simply could not address at this moment.
This is different from the occasional misconception that soft instruments
are unique and effective for their softness only. The notion of a soft
instrument constituting in these cases an "altemative"224 also seems
misleading: it hints at the existence of a choice-yet if the soft
instrument is unique in this narrow sense, there is none.
If the uniqueness of the entire instrument refers to its
distinctiveness from a "hard law" instrument, yet does not entail the
filling of policy gaps beyond what "hard law" can do, it seems to offer
an alternative to reaching a policy objective. Because certain softness
on some dimensions is "permissible" in terms of reaching adequate
effectiveness, a soft instrument can be the preferred alternative for other
reasons, such as for being less costly to negotiate, lighter to administer
or quicker to adapt to the evolving circumstances.
The uniqueness of certain (combinations of) characteristics,
instead of the entire soft instrument, leads to a different kind of
complementarity-the type Shaffer and Pollack described. 225 The
differences in the softness of a soft and a hard instrument lead them to
interact in a way that, together, creates a complementary result. The
complementary characteristics may make up for certain soft dimensions
in legal instruments-on which the complementing instrument is in fact
harder-and result in even harder combinations. Some non-legal
instrument may in this way prove harder on important dimensions than
many existing legal instruments, particularly on precision, even though
they are soft on others.

223. The role of soft instruments as antagonists to hard law were excluded from the
scope of this paper.
224. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 4 7, at 717-21.
225. Id. at 721-22.
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As for the unavoidability of soft instruments as a consequence of
globalization, the nuance that can be identified in the softness of
instruments calls for a similarly delicate attention in managing such
instruments. To the extent that globalization implies the predominance
of instruments without a hard instrumentum, it may imply doubtful
effectiveness. Yet, this is not at all self-evident, and can only be
determined on a context-specific instrument-by-instrument analysis.
The complication would offer one explanation to why it is so difficult to
create clear-cut theories and approaches about the global governance of
TNCs, or governance through regime complexes more generally
speaking.

EPILOGUE - REVISITING THE CHEVRON CASE
While the Chevron case dragged on in the Ecuadorian judiciary
and now continues in the arbitration bodies, Chevron has aligned itself
with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
("VPSHR") and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
("EITI"). Will these soft instruments offer a remedy to address the
considerable environmental degradation? Could they prevent similar
cases from taking place in the future? The EITI aims at transparent
financial flows between the extractive industry and their host
governments. VPSHR aims to prevent human rights abuses that would
be a consequence of companies' private security operations. Already in
terms of the subject matter, these instruments do not present
comprehensive solutions to address issues of environmental protection
or human rights protection. Regrettably, when assessed through the tool
developed in this paper, they appear moreover to be of the softest type.
Both are predominantly private, non-legal instruments, with some
involvement of governments in the VPSHR. The rather vague and nonmandatory principles are quite soft in terms of precision and obligation,
and auditing as the only measure of delegation leaves this dimension
soft as well. In fact, the principal aim of both instruments may rather be
to shield companies from further liability rather than addressing
fundamental aspects of human rights or environmental protection
related conduct. In other words, a closer analysis of softness reveals
there to be little hope for these particular soft instruments preventing, let
alone remedying, the situation in cases such as Chevron.
More promising, at least for future cases, could be the National
Contact Points under the revised 2000 OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Especially insofar as the damage can be
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qualified as (environmental) human rights or labor rights violations, a
"specific procedure" can be commenced before the United States
NCP. 226 As was discussed above in Section IV (C), such procedures
may lead to public statements by the N CP, or to a settlement of the
dispute between the parties. However, due to the very limited
delegation dimension, an NCP cannot order damages; it can primarily
be useful in ceasing the TN C conduct.

226. See U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, U.S. DEP'T ST., available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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